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SUING OPEC
Spencer Weber Waller*

Record gasoline prices, large regional price disparities, and outright
shortages in certain areas of the country over the summer of 2000 and beyond
have made the international oil companies and the Organization for Petroleum
Exporting Countries ("OPEC")1 into public enemies in a manner not seen
since the energy crises of the 1970s. As in the past, Congress and the public
have turned to antitrust for a solution. Congress held hearings' and bullied the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") into investigating whether high gasoline
prices in the Midwest were the product of unlawful collusion among the oil
companies.3 While the FTC's investigation did not result in any enforcement
action, it seems highly unlikely that anyone (including the politicians) actually
thought that higher prices were the result of an unlawful conspiracy between
members of the oil industry.4 It would be unnecessary for such inviting targets

*
Professor and Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. Igratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Patrick McFadden, Mark A.A.
Warner and from colloquia at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Brooklyn Law School, and the
2000 regional meeting of the American Society ofInternational Law in Houston, Texas. Financial support
was provided by Loyola University Chicago School of Law through summer research stipends. Portions
of this article have been adapted from KINGMAN BREWSTER, JAMES ATWOOD & SPENCER WEBER WALLER,
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (3d ed. 1997 & Supp.) with permission of the publisher
West Group (all rights reserved).
I. The structure, formation and earlyoperation ofOPEC are discussed in JOHN EVANS, OPEC AND
THE WORLD ENERGY MARKET: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE (Gavin Brown ed., 2d ed. 1993);

M.A. Ajomo, An Appraisal of the Organizationof the PetroleumExporting Countries(OPEC), 13 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 11 (1977); Farin Mirvahabi, Claims to the Oil Resources in the Persian Gulf: Will the World
Economy be Controlledby the Gulf in the Future?, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 75 (1976); Mark R. Joelson &
Joseph P. Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels Under United States Antitrust and Public
InternationalLaw, 9 INT'L LAW. 617 (1975); Andrew C. Udin, Comment, Slaying Goliath: The
ExtraterritorialApplicationof U.S. Antitrust Law to OPEC, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1321 (2001); Gail Marie
King, Comment, Cartel Pricingin theInternationalEnergy Market: OPEC in Perspective,54 OR. L. REV.
643 (1975).

2. Hearings in the House of Representatives were held before the International Relations
Committee in February, 2000, the Judiciary Committee in March, 2000, and the Commerce Committee in
June, 2000.
3.

See Midwest Gasoline PricesHearing,Before the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong.

(2000) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm.) available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2000/06/gasolinecommerce.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
4. The investigation was assigned to the Chicago Field office of the FTC, which specializes in
consumer protection cases and has not handled a major competition investigation in years.
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of the public's wrath to engage in explicit collusion when the same results
could be obtained by unilaterally and lawfully riding the waves of supply and

demand.
If antitrust is unlikely to be a successful weapon against domestic and

international oil companies, OPEC once again becomes an inviting target.
OPEC has never been a popular entity with the American public. In the
public's perception, it epitomizes a greedy, rapacious international cartel that
preys on the American public in defiance of our 110-year tradition of market
competition embodied in the Sherman Act. Why should we not unleash the
full power of the federal antitrust agencies, 5 state antitrust enforcers, and
private treble damage litigation (perhaps class actions as well) against a group
of foreign nations acting against American interests?
Congress apparently pursued this line of thinking in a slew of bills and
resolutions that sought to punish OPEC members if oil production did riot
increase and prices did not begin to fall.6 Congress introduced several bills
to make it easier to sue OPEC under the antitrust laws by abolishing certain
defenses and immunities thought to stand in the way of such a suit.7
Congressional leaders further grilled antitrust enforcement agency personnel
as to why they had not already taken such action! Eager to please the

5.
The federal antitrust laws are enforced by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department as
well as the FTC. The Antitrust Division has exclusive jurisdiction over the criminal enforcement of these
laws but shares civil enforcement with the FTC. The agencies coordinate their investigations so as not
duplicate effort in the same manner. See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 4 (2001) [hereinafter WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE].
6.
See, e.g., No Oil Producing and Exporting Act of 2001, S.665, 107th Cong. (2001) (so-called
NOPEC legislation); Foreign Trust Busting Act, H.R. 4731, 106th Cong. (2000) (allowing lawsuits against
foreign energy cartels); International Energy Fair Pricing Act of 2000, HR. 4732, 106th Cong. (requiring
review of all U.S. programs to determine if each is aiding OPEC and eliminating such aid); H.R. Con. Res.
276, 106th Cong. (2000) (strongly urging the President to file WTO complaint against OPEC member
nations for unlawfully imposing quantitative restrictions in petroleum exports); Oil Price Reduction Act
of 2000, S. 21 82, 106th Cong. (2000) (eliminating U.S. foreign aid to OPEC nations); Oil Price Reduction
Act of 2000, H.R. 3822, 106th Cong. (2000); S. Res. 263, 106th Cong. (2000). Many of these proposals
are reviewed in Udin, supra note 1, at 1366-70.
This is not the first time that Congress has attempted to "solve" the problem of OPEC through
legislation. See Albert Gore, Jr., The Cartel Restriction Act of 1979: Response to a Global Economic
Problem, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 273 (1979) (discussing bill introduced by then Representative Al
Gore to restrict act of state doctrine and foreign compulsion doctrine in wake ofOPEC and uranium cartel
decisions). The doctrinal changes to these defenses have largely been accomplished through Supreme Court
and lower court decisions. See infra notes 128-51 and accompanying text.
7.
S. 665 (authorizing Department of Justice and FTC to file antitrust lawsuits against OPEC in
U.S. courts and proving that sovereign immunity and act of state defenses would be unavailable in any such
suit).
8.
See supra note 2.
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Congressional overseers who control budgets and nominations of key
personnel, the antitrust agencies came forward with a variety of reasons why
OPEC could not be sued in United States courts for its admittedly
anticompetitive actions.9
Congress was apparently left with the impression that it is either
impossible or extremely difficult to sue OPEC. This is not entirely
unreasonable, since OPEC was the target of private antitrust actions in the
1970s which were dismissed, first under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,'°
and later on appeal under the Act of State Doctrine."
While a federal antitrust action against OPEC would be a futile and
counterproductive effort to conduct American foreign policy in a federal
courtroom, particularly in light of the aftermath of the attacks of
September 11, 2001, there are, in fact, no real doctrinal barriers to doing so.
None of the classic international antitrust defenses would be available to the
OPEC defendants if such a law suit were brought (however foolishly) by the
federal government nor in all likelihood in a suit brought by either the states
or a private plaintiff. The actions of OPEC would most likely be characterized
as "commercial activity" permitting jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act ("FSIA"). However, this is a matter of characterization that
could be the easiest path for a district court judge looking to avoid
adjudicating the merits of this type of controversial case. 2 Since the last
OPEC decisions, the Supreme Court has gutted the Act of State Doctrine so
that it would not be an effective defense for OPEC or virtually any other
foreign antitrust defendant. 3 The doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion
would not apply to any challenge to OPEC itself, and would at most serve to
protect a private defendant if sued for unlawful conduct compelled by the
OPEC nations. 4 Finally, the Supreme Court has virtually eliminated the
nebulous and frequently unsuccessful doctrine of comity.' 5 Moreover, the
federal government has stated numerous times that it does not regard itself to
be bound by these defenses if it determines that it is in the overall best

9.
See Solutions to Competitive Problems in the Oil Industry: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (Statement of Richard G. Parker, Director, Bureau of Competition,
Fed. Trade Comm.), available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/opectestimony.htm (last visited Dec. 20,
2002).
10. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
11. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
12. See infra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 152-206 and accompanying text.
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interests of the United States to bring an antitrust enforcement action
involving international commerce.16
Does that mean it is open season on OPEC, and the executive branch is
derelict in its duties for not taking action? Should private plaintiffs and state
governments be lining up for their shot at public enemy number one, enriching
themselves in the process? No, of course not. There are doctrines of standing
and antitrust injury that would bar virtually all private law suits for damages
against the OPEC nations. 7 There are also long-standing concerns over the
role of the states in foreign affairs that would properly bar most state
8
enforcement actions in this situation.'
Regardless of the attractiveness of private suits, why has the Antitrust
Division and the FTC remained silent in the face of this threat to competition?
Even without any serious doctrinal barriers to such a lawsuit, little would be
accomplished, except a clumsy and futile attempt to obtain an unenforceable
remedy that would come at great cost to the foreign policy of the United
States. The late Kingman Brewster warned that antitrust law in the foreign
arena should not be enforced to the full extent of the law where doing so
would be detrimental to the overall interests of the United States. 9 The
Antitrust Division and the FTC know this lesson well. They also know that
OPEC cannot be punished in any meaningful way through the United States'
antitrust laws.
OPEC's power has waxed and waned as market conditions have changed
and the individual needs of its members have become more pressing than the
benefits of collective action.2" Moreover, the foreign policy interests of the
United States have so far overridden whatever perceived benefits might arise
from taking enforcement action under the antitrust laws. This will be the
enduring truth for the short and medium terms no matter the extent of
Congressional rage and public frustration with prices at the pump.
This article is a look inside Pandora's Box. Sure, you can sue OPEC
under the antitrust laws (at least if you are the federal government), but how
dumb can you get?

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 234-60 and accompanying text.
See generallyKJNGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST
See EVANS, supra note 1, at 393-705.

ANDAMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
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I. HAVEN'T WE BEEN HERE BEFORE?

While OPEC has been a high profile concern of competition policy since
its formation, it has only been the subject of two private antitrust actions.
There have been no governmental challenges to OPEC under the antitrust laws
and the antitrust agencies have declined to participate in either of the private
cases. The first suit was dismissed because the Ninth Circuit Court held that
the OPEC nations were immune from the antitrust laws under two different
theories.2 A second, pending suit originally granted a default judgment and
injunction against OPEC itself, but that decision was vacated and the suit is
proceeding toward a decision on the merits.22 While crystal balls are
notoriously difficult to use, it appears that the first case is now bereft of most
of its analytical support because of subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing
with transnational litigation not directly related to the antitrust field.
A. The FirstOPEC Decision
The first antitrust case to directly attack OPEC was filed in the 1970s at
the height of the energy crisis and public frustration with the economic and
political power of the Arab states belonging to OPEC.23 A private antitrust
case seeking treble damages and injunctive relief against OPEC as an
organization and its thirteen member states was filed in December, 1978 in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California. The
plaintiff was the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers which alleged that its members had been damaged through the pricefixing activity of OPEC. No defendant ever appeared. The court was mindful
that the FSIA prohibited entry of a default judgment against a foreign nation
without proof and a finding that the plaintiff was entitled to relief.24 The court
conducted a full hearing using briefs from a variety of amici and heard
evidence from the plaintiffs and various court-appointed experts.25

21. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
22. Order Vacating Default Judgement and Injunction, and Setting Briefing Schedule on Process
and Jurisdictional Issues (N.D. Ala., May 2, 2001).
23. While OPEC had non-Arab member nations such as Indonesia, Ecuador, Gabon, and Venezuela,
and other nations like Norway, profit substantially from OPEC-led price increases, the Middle Eastern
OPEC nations have defined its identity with the United States public.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2000).
25. Interestingly, one of those amici was represented by now-Justice Antonin Scalia, the author of
one of the subsequent Supreme Court decisions which undercut the Act of State rationale relied upon in
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1. The Trial CourtDecision
At the close of the trial, the court granted judgment in favor of the
defendants and sought to erect a multi-tiered thicket of defenses and
immunities barring liability.2 6 First, the Court determined that OPEC as an
entity was dismissed from the litigation because it had not been, and could not
be, lawfully served.27 The court also held that the claims for damages had to
be dismissed under the "direct purchaser" doctrine that bars suits for damages,
except by persons who directly purchased from the defendants, The court,
however, chose to consider the request for injunctive relief on the merits.28
The court also held that foreign nations were not "persons" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act and therefore could not be sued.29 Finally, for
good measure, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove proximate cause
connecting the defendants' alleged price fixing to any domestic oil price
increases.3" The court's principal holding was that the defendant nations were
immune from jurisdiction under the FSIA because control and regulation of
a nation's natural resources is sovereign, rather than commercial, in nature.3 '

the Ninth Circuit decision in OPEC. See infra notes 128-39 and accompanying text. Then-Professor Scalia
in fact appeared in the matter on appeal before the Ninth Circuit for the defendants-appellees. The United
States was invited to participate in both the district court and appellate proceeding but neither did do so,
nor took any position in the matter.
26. Int'l Ass'n ofMachinists v. OPEC,477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The district court OPEC
opinion is discussed and analyzed from different perspectives in several contemporary student law notes.
See Stanley E. Hilton, Note, IAM v. OPEC: The Demise ofthe Restrictive Theory ofSovereign Immunity
and ofthe ExtraterritorialEffect ofthe Sherman ActAgainstForeign Sovereigns,41 U. PITT. L. REV. 841

(1980) (arguing that the Sherman Act should apply); Lawrence Crocker, Note, Sovereign Immunity and the
SuitAgainst OPEC, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 215 (1980) (arguing that the district court misapplied legal

doctrine but reached the correct result).
27. 477 F. Supp. at 560. Fora different conclusion on the amenability of OPEC itself to suit in the
United States, see Prewitt Enterprises v. OPEC, 2001-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,246. See generally E.C.
Lashbrooke, Jr., Suits Against International Organizations in Federal Court: OPEC, a Case Study, 12
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 305 (1982).
28. 477 F. Supp. at 560-63.
29. Id. at 570-72.

30. Id. at 572-74.
31.

Id. at 565-69. See also notes 73-90 infra and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of

the issue of sovereign versus commercial activities under the FSIA.
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2. On Appeal
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds.3 2 Of the
myriad of issues addressed by the district court, the Ninth Circuit only
discussed sovereign immunity and the Act of State Doctrine. The court noted
that the FSIA directed courts to "look upon the act itself rather than
underlying sovereign motivations."33 Despite thus hinting that the district
court had misapplied the codified version of sovereign immunity under the
FSIA, the court stated:
The district court was understandably troubled by the broader implications of an antitrust action against the OPEC nations. The importance of the alleged price-fixing activity
to the OPEC nations, cannot be ignored. Oil revenues represent their only significant
source of income. Consideration of their sovereignty cannot be separated fiom their near
total dependence upon oil. We find that these concerns are appropriately addressed by
application of the act of state doctrine. While we do not apply the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, its elements remain relevant to our discussion of the act of state doctrine.34

The essence of the Ninth Circuit's act of state analysis is set forth in the
first sentence of that section of the opinion which states: "The act of state
doctrine declares that a United States court will not adjudicate a politically
sensitive dispute which would require the court to judge the legality of the
sovereign act of a foreign state."" The court relied on some of the classic act
of state cases in declaring that the act of state had constitutional roots in the
separation of powers and was similar to the political question doctrine.36
The court next distinguished sovereign immunity from the Act of State
Doctrine. In contrast to the jurisdictional aspects of sovereign immunity, the
act of state was "a prudential doctrine designed to avoid judicial action in
sensitive areas."37 This distinction was crucial to the court, which then
refused to recognize any commercial activities exception in the act of state
context:
While purely commercial activity may not rise to the level of an act of state, certain
seemingly commercial activity will trigger act of state considerations. As the district

32. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 1358.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1358-59. Fora discussion of the now-discarded Sabbatinoline of act of state cases, see
infra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
37. Id. at 1359.
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court noted, OPEC's 'price-fixing' activityhas a significant soyereign component. While
the FSIA ignores the underlying purpose of a state's action, the act of state doctrine does
not. This court has stated that motivations of the sovereign must be examined for a
public interest basis. When the state qua state acts in the public interest, its sovereignty
is asserted. The courts must proceed cautiously to avoid an affront to that sovereignty.

Because the act ofstate doctrine and the doctrine ofsovereign immunity address different
concerns and apply in different circumstances, we find that the act of state doctrine
remains available when such caution is appropriate, regardless of any commercial
component of the activity involved. 8

The court bolstered its conclusion with brief discussions of the international
political sensitivity of the dispute, the futility of the remedy being sought by
the plaintiffs, and the lack of international consensus against price-fixing as
further reasons to abstain from deciding the case under the Act of State
Doctrine. Thus, OPEC's status under the antitrust laws has rested on this
decision for more than twenty years, while the law upon which the decision
was based has evolved away from the principles enunciated by either the
district court or the Ninth Circuit.
B. Prewitt v. OPEC
In 2001, a district court reached the opposite conclusion in a consumer
class action against OPEC itself, but not its member states. In Prewitt
Enterprises,Inc. v. OPEC, 9 a gas station operator sued OPEC on behalf of all
private entities who purchased refined petroleum products in the United States
after March, 1999. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, but not damages, 40 for
violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act relating to OPEC's pricefixing and production quotas. 4'
As in the earlier litigation, OPEC did not appear or otherwise respond to
the case. Following an order to show cause why a default judgment should
not be entered, and after an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the default
judgment and entered an injunction against OPEC from further violation of
the antitrust laws.4 2 The court reserved judgment on the request for attorneys'

38.
39.

Id. at 1360 (citation omitted).
2001-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,246.

40. In seeking injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, but not treble damages under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, the plaintiffs largely circumvented the "indirect purchaser" doctrine which
bars damage suits from those who did not deal directly with the defendants. Id. at 90,132. See infra Part
IX.

41.

2001-1 Trade Cas. at 90,127.

42.

Id.
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fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses to counsel for plaintiff and the
class.
The court directly confronted the prior OPEC decision and rejected its
result and reasoning on three separate grounds. First, the court concluded that
OPEC's activities plainly constituted commercial activity, that the earlier
OPECdecision had not fully considered the commercial activities exception
for the act of state set forth by the plurality of the Supreme Court in Alfred
Dunhill,and that such an analysis would command a majority of the Supreme
Court today.43 The court also held that the acts of the OPEC members took
place outside their territory, thus falling within an established exception to the
Act of State Doctrine." Finally, the court noted the narrowing of the act of
state defense generally as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in W.S.
Kirkpatrick& Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l.'"
The litigation was transferred to the Chief Judge of the Northern District
of Alabama. After considering extensive amicus briefs from the OPEC
nations, the new judge vacated the default judgment and injunction in a brief
order without analysis and has set a briefing schedule for the defendant's
motion to dismiss. 6
Given that OPECwas against the member nations of OPEC, and Prewitt
is against OPEC itself, it is not clear, at this stage, whether different
conclusions will be reached, or if the two decisions will ultimately rest on the
same legal theories. What is clear is that the legal basis for the original OPEC
decision is no longer the solid bed rock that it was in 1976. The Supreme
Court may have opened the way for antitrust suits against OPEC quite
inadvertently, when it eliminated or narrowed the most applicable
international antitrust defenses in routine non-antitrust cases that raised none
of the explosive issues of a case against OPEC or its members.
II. SUING THE SOVEREIGN

An issue which some courts, including the district court in the original
OPECcase, see as distinct from immunity of the sovereign is whether the

43. Id. at 90,131-32 (citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
696-99(1976)). See generally 1SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST ANDAMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD

§ 8.13 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp.) [hereinafter WALLER, ANTITRUST).
44. 2001-1 Trade Cas. at 90,132.
45. 493 U.S. 400 (1990). See infra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
46. Order Vacating Default Judgment and Injunction, and Setting Briefing Schedule on Process and
Jurisdictional Issues (N.D. Ala., May 2, 2001).
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Sherman Act and other American antitrust statutes were intended to regulate
the actions of governments in the first place. If not, it would follow that
foreign governments may not be sued, not because they have immunity, but
because their conduct is not regulated by the statute. In discussing the
Sherman Act's applicability to actions of a domestic state, the Supreme Court
has stated:
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was
intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state....
There is no suggestion ofa purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislative history.
The sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that
it prevented only "business combinations." That its purpose was to suppress
combinations to restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals and
corporations,abundantly appears from its legislative history."

Where a state imposes a trade restraint "as an act of the government" ' 8 the
Sherman Act thus is not applicable. This interpretation of the Act was based
in part on notions of federalism, but comity considerations in the international
sphere arguably lead to the conclusion that the Sherman Act does not regulate
the conduct of foreign states. The district court in the first OPEC decision so
held, although that ruling was gratuitous in light of its simultaneous holding
that the governments enjoyed sovereign immunity for the claims at issue.49
Two other courts have also stated that the conduct of foreign sovereigns
was not actionable under the Sherman Act." However, in those cases no
governments were named as parties and the courts' essential point was that the
private defendants should not be held liable for actions taken by a foreign
sovereign.
If the issue were to reach the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the Court
would adopt the sweeping conclusion that the Sherman Act has no application
to actions of foreign governments. The Court has already held that foreign
governments are "persons" as that term is used in the Clayton and Sherman
Acts.5 Although that was in the context of foreign governments as plaintiffs
rather than defendants, the ruling lays the textual basis for a conclusion that
47. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,351 (1943) (emphasis added, citations omitted). See also FTC
v.Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); City of Columbia v.Omni OutdoorAdva., Inc., 499 U.S. 365
(1991); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-69 (1984).
48. 317 U.S. at 352.
49. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553,570-72 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd on other
grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
50. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 78 n.14 (2d Cir. 1977); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v.
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F,Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970).
51. Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 311 (1978).
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foreign governments may be sued under the antitrust laws. With that textual
basis, the Court will require a showing of "some overriding public policy
which negates the construction of coverage."52 Comity might be cited as such
a policy, but the principles of comity are already incorporated into American
law through limitations on extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Act of State
Doctrine, and, of course, sovereign immunity. Where none of these provides
a defense for a foreign sovereign, as when it is engaged in commercial
activities within American borders, it is difficult to see an overriding policy
interest that would bar suit."
The susceptibility of a foreign sovereign to suit must therefore turn on a
construction of the antitrust statutes and related rules ofjudicial restraint, and
not on an absolute rule of nonapplicability. Otherwise, foreign governments
with impunity could organize and implement restrictive commercial practices
that are highly damaging to the American economy and that do not deserve
immunity from attack under the Sherman Act.
III.

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

A foreign government's interest in a company under antitrust complaint
raises the question of sovereign immunity. As in the earlier OPEC case,54 a
foreign government may itself be sued for the manner in which it regulates
privately owned businesses within its territory. Before reaching the merits of
antitrust claims in such suits, a court must ask whether sovereign immunity
precludes the consideration of antitrust sanctions."
Sovereign immunity determinations were once shared by the executive
and judicial branches. As a general rule, a foreign sovereign enjoyed
immunity in United States courts for its public acts, but not for its private or

52. Lafayette v. La. Power& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 (1978) (holding that municipalities may
be sued under the antitrust laws)
53. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 397 (D. Del. 1978); Douglas H. Meal
& Joel P. Trachtman, Comment, Defenses to Actions Against Foreign States Under the United States
Antitrust Laws, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 583,604-09 (1979). But cf James F. Bouerle & Kevin I. MacKenzie,
Note, American Antitrust Liability of Foreign State Instrumentalities: A New Application ofthe Parker
Doctrine, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 305 (1978) (arguing that Parker may bar some suits against foreign
sovereigns even where all other defenses are inapplicable).
54. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
55. A sovereign immunity defense is jurisdictional in nature, and thus must be decided by the court
even if the defendant fails to appear to assert the defense. Id. at 564-65; 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2000)
(providing that a default judgment may not be entered against a foreign state "unless the claimant
establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court").
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commercial acts.56 In UnitedStates v. DeutschesKalisyndikat Gesellschaft,"
the United States sued to enjoin the violation of the antitrust laws by a French
corporation which sold potash within the United States. France owned the
majority of the capital stock of the corporation. The court held, over the
protest of the French Ambassador, that the French corporation could be sued
despite the plea of sovereign immunity, because a private corporation, "being
an entity distinct from its stockholders, [cannot claim] immunity... on the
'
ground that it and the government of France are identical in any respect."58
Departures from this approach were not uncommon, however. One court
held, in the course of the international petroleum investigation, that a
commercial oil company was entitled to sovereign immunity because thirtyfive percent of its stock was owned by the British government and it
performed certain public functions in supplying the British navy. 9 In a
subsequent antitrust investigation of the ocean shipping industry, the same
court reserved enforcement of a subpoena upon Philippine National Lines,
owned by the Philippine government, despite an explicit State Department
determination that sovereign immunity was inappropriate.
The court
concluded that the safer course was to deny enforcement until the antitrust
prosecutors provided further details on the alleged commercial activities of
National Lines and on the need for the requested documents."' Such judicial
vicissitudes were complemented by the fact that political factors occasionally
weighed in the State Department's consideration of immunity pleas.62
56. The Department of State formallyadopted this positic in 1952. Letterof Jack B. Tate, Acting
Legal Advisor, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), inDEP'T ST. BULL., June
1952,at984-85. The Department's determinations in sovereign immunity disputes were generally regarded
as binding on the judicial branch, and in the absence of a Departmental determination the court would
determine the matter on its own. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945);ExparteRepublic
of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
57. 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
58. Id. at 202. The Department of State submitted a letter in the case expressing its view that foreign
governments engaged in ordinary commercial transactions in the United States enjoyed no special privileges
or immunities.
59. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 288-91 (D.D.C. 1952).
60. In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
61. Id. at 318-20.
62. See Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits ofJudicialControl,18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429,430 (1977).
Even where the State Department narrowly construed the immunities of foreign sovereigns in commercial
matters, the interest of a foreign sovereign in a business subject to antitrust attack resulted, on occasion,
in the omission of a foreign party from the roster of defendants as a matter ofdiplomacy and administration.
In the case of the Chilean Nitrate and Iodine Sales Corporation, the Department of Justice nol prossed the
action against the Chilean corporation at the request of the Secretaryof State "in the interestof maintaining
friendly relations between the Government of Chile and this Government." See The Federal Antitrust Laws
(CCH) 195 (1942). The proceedings against the foreign oil companies in the cartel investigation were
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In an effort to eliminate such vagaries, Congress enacted the FSIA in
1976.63 The Act codified the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity
(under -which commercial activities were subject to suit) and vested
exclusively in the judicial branch the job of resolving immunity claims.
Detailed rules were set out on serving process on foreign sovereigns and on
the attachment or execution of their assets.64 The Act did not purport to
change any substantive law,65 but Congress clearly saw the legislation as
expanding the rights of United States citizens in their dealings with foreign
sovereigns.66
The critical provisions likely to affect antitrust litigation can be quickly
summarized. It is now settled that the FSIA is the exclusive source of subject
matter jurisdiction over suits involving foreign states or instrumentalities.6 7
District courts have original jurisdiction over suits against foreign states.68

ultimately dropped on similar grounds. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
63. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330,1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611). ArgentineRep. v. Amerada Hess ShippingCorp.,
488 U.S. 428 (1989), was an action by two Liberian corporations against Argentina in United States district
court to recover for damage by Argentina to plaintiffs' ships during the Falklands War. The Supreme Court
held that the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over an action against a foreign state
and none of its exceptions applied to the facts presented in this case. See also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank
of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1983).
64. No discussion is included here on the questions of service of process, 28 U.S.C. § 1608,
attachment of assets, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-10, or execution ofjudgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1611. For a discussion
of these and other provisions see JOSEPH W. DELLAPENA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR
CORPORATIONS (1988).

65. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610 ("The bill
is not intended to affect the substantive law of liability."). See also Boxer v. Gottlieb, 652 F. Supp. 1056,
1056, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that provisions of FSIA were not intended to create a new federal
cause of action, but to provide access to federal courts for resolution of ordinary legal disputes involving
a foreign sovereign); Jackson v. People's Rep. of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1496 (1 th Cir. 1986) (FSIA does
not apply retroactively to confer subject matter jurisdiction in an action against People's Republic of China
for payment of defaulted bearer bonds).
66. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 at 6-8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6604, 6604-06.
However, the FSIA does not apply retroactively to a cause of action arising from debt instruments issued
by the Russian Imperial Government in 1916. Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988). The only method to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is under the
FSIA. Since this applies to civil and criminal acts, allegations of criminal activities under a RICO claim
would be precluded from jurisdiction under that Act. Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 750
F. Supp. 838, 843-44 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
67. Argentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000). The section is phrased in terms of "nonjury civil action[s]" against
foreign states. Some courts have read this not as a limitation on the scope of the section, but as a
requirement that suits against foreign states be tried without juries, See Jones v. Shipping Corp. of India,
491 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Va. 1980); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va.
1980); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 396 (D. Del. 1978); H.R. REP.No. 94-1487
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The term "foreign state" is broadly defined to include foreign governmental
agencies or instrumentalities, including corporations that are majority-owned
by a foreign state or political subdivision. 69 The statute states a general rule
of immunity for foreign states, but that immunity is subject to provisions of
prior international agreements and to exceptions provided in the Act itself."

at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611-12. In order to avoid constitutional questions, other
courts have ruled that state-owned commercial entities may be subjected to jury trials when sued under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), providing for diversity jurisdiction in suits against citizens of foreign states. See
Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980), vacated by 667 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir.
1982); Lonon v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Basileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Icenogle v.
Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979), noted in Recent Decision, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 219 (1980). Venue for suits against foreign states is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f), amended by § 5
of the FSIA.
The Williams holding that the FSIA compels a nonjury trial was affirmed, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir.
1981), and the contrary ruling in Houston was vacated. Houston, 667 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1982). The
Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have also joined those courts construing the Act as precluding jury trials
against foreign sovereigns, including state-owned commercial entities. Bailey v. Grand Trunk Lines New
Eng., 805 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1986); Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1982);
Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981); Rex v.
Cia. Peruana de Vapores, SA., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 198 1), noted in Monroe Leigh, Judicial Decision, 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 393 (1982). Accord Kraikeman v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 674 F. Supp. 136
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Kaufman, 593 F. Supp. 1189, 1192-93 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (2000).
As a general matter, entities which meet the definition of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state" could assume a variety of forms, including a state trading corporation, a mining enterprise,
a transport organization such as a shipping lineor airline, a steel company, a central bank, an export
association, a govemmental procurement agency or a department or ministry which acts and is
suable in its own name.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 at 15-16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,6614. For a holding by an
antitrust court that a state trading company of a socialist country is within this definition, see Outboard
Marine Corp., 461 F. Supp. at 394-95.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000). See Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen. ofNigeria, 830 F.2d 1018 (9th
Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant's torts in renting houses in California falls within the tortious activity
exception to immunity (§ 1605(a)(5)). In addition, the lease contained a waiver of immunity, which the
court found to be an implied consent to an American court's jurisdiction.).
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Those include predictable exceptions for cases of waiver7' and for certain
counterclaims2
IV.

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

For antitrust purposes, the most important exception is for commercial
activities. Foreign states are not immune from a suit:
[I]n which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States
by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity ofthe foreign state elsewhere

and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.. .

The term commercial activities is defined in the Act as meaning "either
'
a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular transaction or act."74
There is also the additional key sentence: "The commercial character of an
activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct
or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." '
The legislative history suggests that conduct that private persons normally
perform should be regarded as commercial, even where the object of the

71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2000). Some courts have held that a defense under the Act is waived
if a foreign country fails to appear in a proceeding to raise sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense.
Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Rep., 623 F. Supp. 246, 252-53 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated by 736
F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1990); In re Oil Spill, 491 F. Supp. 161, 167-68 (N.D. II. 1979). It is now clear,
however, that the Act defines the scope of subject matter as well as personal jurisdiction. See De Sanchez
v. Banco Cent. de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1389 (5th Cir. 1985); Olsen v. Gov't of Mex., 729 F.2d 641,644
(9th Cir. 1984). "Accordingly, even if the foreign state does not enter an appearance to assert an immunity
defense, a district court still must determine that immunity is unavailable under the Act." Verlinden B.V.
v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,494 n.20 (1983). See also Meadows v. Dominican Rep., 628 F. Supp.
599 (N.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 817 F2d 617 (9th Cir. 1987); Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Rep. of Bolivia, 613
F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated by 811 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987). On the other hand, the failure
to assert sovereign immunity in a responsive pleading will give rise to a waiver. Canadian Overseas Ores,
Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 727 F.2d 274, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1984). Cf Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc. v. Comm. of Receivers for A.W, Galardi, 12 F.3d 317,325-28 (2d Cir. 1994); Frolova
v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing circumstances
that will support an implied waiver of sovereign immunity). See also Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen.
of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1987) (waiver of immunity contained in lease).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (2000),
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2000).
75. Id. See also EnvtL Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.J.
1987), affld in part, rev'd in part, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1987), and aff'd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
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activity is to fulfill a governmental purpose.76 For example, contracting to buy
provisions for the armed services or to repair an embassy building are to be
treated as commercial, since private parties normally negotiate and sign
contracts. On the other hand, if the activity is normally done only by
governments-such as imposing a tariff or issuing export licenses-immunity
is available even if there are important business or commercial motivations
behind the government action." Of course, a particular activity may normally

76. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 14, 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615.
77. Id. See also United Euram Corp. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Rep., 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (executing contract for cultural performances pursuant to intergovernmental cultural exchange
program was a commercialactivity);Jurisdiction of U.S. Courtsin Suits AgainstForeign States: Hearing
on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 53 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser of the
Department of State) ("the courts would inquirewhether theactivity in question is one which private parties
ordinarily perform or whether it is peculiarly within the realm of governments"). Under this approach, it
seems clear thatln reInvestigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 288-91 (D.D.C. 1952), has
been legislatively overruled. Accord ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 8 n.21 (1977) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDE]. There the court found the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company immune from anforcement of an antitrust subpoena because of its partial
government ownership and services in supplying the British navy with petroleum. See WALLER,
ANTITRUST, supra note 43, § 2.16. See also Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr. v. Hellenic Rep., 877
F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that contracts executed byGreece to reimburse the hospital and an organ
bank for the cost of kidney transplants performed on Greek citizens in the United States are not a uniquely
governmental function); Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Rep. of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308-10 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that contracts for the purchase of cement for infrastructure construction projects are
commercial in nature). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Rep. of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 349 (8th Cir.)
(holding that a contract by a foreign government to purchase military equipment constitutes commercial
activity). Compare with MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Rep. of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a contract relating to the export of rhesus monkeys, a natural resource, is sovereign activity).
The MOL decision is criticized tellingly in Marc A. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 308-09 (1986).
In Letelier v. Rep. of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), the court observed that activity should not
be deemed "'commercial' as a whole simply because certain aspects of it are commercial." Id. at 796.
Moreover, the court stated, "not every act of a foreign state that could be done by a private citizen in the
United States is 'commercial activity.' The court must inquire whether the activity is of the type an
individual would customarily carry on for profit." Id. at 797 (citation omitted). See also Practical
Concepts, Inc. v. Rep. of Bolivia, 613 F. Supp. 863, 869-70 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated by 811 F.2d 1543
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a contract for the design and implementation of a plan for development of
Bolivia's rural areas was commercial in nature despite some indicia of governmental activity in other
aspects of the contract); Chisholm &Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding
that assisting in obtaining lines of credit for the corporation was commercial, even though the bank was
promoting a government economic recovery program by engaging in such activity); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui
Mining & Smelting Co,, 947 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991) (misappropriation of trade secrets by a French
govemment-owned firm was characterized as a commercial act and thus within the exception to sovereign
immunity). But see Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that the
appropriate inquiry is whether "the gravamen of the complaint [is] a sovereign activity. . ."). See generally
Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial A ctivity: A Conflicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
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be conducted by private firms in the United States, but by government
agencies in a foreign country. In such cases the Justice Department has left
open the possibility of some deference to foreign mores. 8
In two early antitrust cases construing the legislation, the courts reached
different results when they applied the commercial exception.79 The facts of
the two cases were radically different, however. The first court had no
difficulty in finding that a Polish trading company's manufacture and export
of golf carts into the United States were commercial in nature. 0
A different result obviously was reached in the private litigation against
OPEC.8' When the defendant governments failed to appear, the district court
undertook its own study of OPEC's price-setting efforts and concluded that
they were accomplished through taxation of private companies, production
controls administered by "conservation" laws, and direct price quotations on
government-owned oil. 2 The first two functions were deemed clearly
governmental in nature. 3 The third, while commercial at first blush, was
merely a different "medium" by which the OPEC governments were
performing sovereign acts. 4 The court noted considerable acceptance within
the United Nations, and indeed by the United States, of the sovereign right of
states to exercise control over the extraction and exploitation of their natural
resources.8 5 Thus:
The control over a nation's natural resources stems from the nature of sovereignty. By
necessity and by traditional recognition, each nation is its own master in respect to its
physical attributes. The defendants' control over their oil resources is an especially
sovereign function because oil, as their primary, ifnot sole, revenue-producing resource,

is crucial to the welfare of their nations' peoples. 6

1440 (1983).
78. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.2 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES); 1977
ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 77, at 8 n.21.

79. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 447 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd on other grounds,
649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
80. Outboard Marine Corp., 461 F. Supp. at 394-96.
81. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.
1981). See also Mastercard Int'l v. Dean Witter, 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(dismissal of antitrust counterclaim for failure to plead commercial activities exception); Rios v. Marshall,
530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that regulation of labor is not commercial activity).
82. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 567-68.
83. 477 F. Supp. at 568.
84. Id. at567-69&n.14.
85. Id. at 567-68.
86.

Id. at 568.
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Accordingly, the court concluded that OPEC's cartel-like activities were
governmental rather than commercial in nature. 7 The district court's analysis
of sovereign immunity was understandable but wrong in the 1970s, under the
"nature not purpose" standard for the commercial activity exception of the
FSIA and even more clearly so today. The first OPEC decision came at the
high water mark of state involvement in the extraction of natural resources.
Since that time, most nations have privatized key aspects of their extractive
industries, making it even more clear that the activities of the OPEC nations
are the kinds of activities customarily engaged in by private firms, and hence
not immune under FSIA.
Even the Ninth Circuit admitted this flaw in the district court's opinion
but nonetheless found a way around it to avoid adjudicating the merits of the
case. While questioning the district court's sovereign immunity analysis, the
court of appeals affirmed on act of state grounds."8 The appellate court
obviously thought that there was a significant commercial component to the
government's activities, 9 but concluded that such a component posed no
difficulties for application of the Act of State Doctrine.9" While this was
probably an accurate interpretation of the Act of State Doctrine in the 1970s,
subsequent events strongly suggest that this defense would no longer be
available to shield OPEC or its member states from liability today.
V.

THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

The Act of State Doctrine is often misused and confused with other
defenses such as governmental compulsion or sovereign immunity. Its
application does not turn on the identity of the defendants 91 or upon a showing
of compulsion. The Act of State Doctrine is not some vague doctrine of

87. Cf Carey v. Nat'l Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),aff'don other grounds,
592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979). In this contract and tort action, the district court concluded that Libya's
induced breach of an oil supply contract bythe Libyan national oil company was a governmental rather than
commercial activity. The court's reliance on Libya's foreign policy objectives in taking the action is
difficult to square with the statute's mandate that "[tihe commercial character of an activity shall be
determined by reference to [its] nature... rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)
(2000).
88. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163
(1982).
89. 649 F.2d at 1360.
90. Id.
91. The defense generally arises in the context of suits against private parties, but it may also be
available where the foreign sovereign itself is a defendant. See Meal & Trachtman, supra note 53, at
627-54.
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abstention, but a principle of decision that is binding on both federal and state
courts. However, act of state issues only arise when a court must decide, i.e.,
when the outcome of the case turns upon the effect of official action by a
foreign sovereign.9 2
A note of caution is needed before exploring the evolving case law and
underpinnings for the Act of State Doctrine. In the words of a recent
American Bar Association monograph: "It is often difficult to discern any
rationale for distinguishing which acts give rise to the doctrine and which do
' The monograph concludes: "In reality, there may be no one 'doctrine,'
not."93
but rather a number of concerns stemming from different sources, and having
different weights depending on the factual context in which they appear."94
What is equally significant is that the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on the Act of State Doctrine has cut back the scope of the
doctrine dramatically in precisely the way that undermines the earlier act of
state holding in the Ninth Circuit's OPECdecision.
A. The TraditionalFormulation
The Act of State Doctrine originated outside the antitrust field. In the
course of a revolution in Venezuela, an American citizen applied to the local
military commander for permission to leave that country to return to the
United States. Permission was refused for some time, and when the American
ultimately returned home, he sued the commander for unlawful detention and
harassment by army troops for the period he was detained in Venezuela.
Chief Justice Fuller rejected the claim in words that have become the "classic
American statement"" of the Act of State Doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one countrywill not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts
the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as
must be obtained through
96
between themselves.

Since the defendant was acting as a government official, this ended the case.

92. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
93.

ABA

ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

No. 20,

SPECIAL DEFENSES

IN INTERNATIONAL

23(1995).

94. Id. at 24.
95. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,416 (1964).

96. Ufderhill v. Hemandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See also Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,
246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); Oetjen v. Cen. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918).

HeinOnline -- 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 123 2002-2003

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:105

Justice Holmes introduced this thinking to the antitrust field inAmerican
Banana Co. v. UnitedFruit Co.97 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the
United Fruit Company prevailed upon the government of Costa Rica to seize
plaintiff's Central American plantation and to thereby eliminate it as a
competitor. Citing Chief Justice Fuller, Justice Holmes concluded that "a
seizure by a state is not a thing that can be complained of elsewhere in the
courts.""8 The question of United Fruit's connivance in the foreign
sovereign's act was also dismissed:
[I]t is a contradiction in terms to say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade
a sovereign power to bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be desirable
and proper. It does not, and foreign courts cannot, admit that the influences were
improper or the results bad. It makes the persuasion lawful by its own act. The very
meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes law.99

In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,' ° a different result was obtained.
There, the government charged that the defendants conspired to monopolize
the sisal trade in the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico, with effects on United
States imports. The Court distinguished American Bananabecause the sisal
conspiracy was formed within the United States, included acts within the
United States, and caused effects in the United States. In noting
discriminatory legislation passed by the Mexican and Yucatan governments
to aid this conspiracy, the Court stated: "but by their own deliberate acts, here
and elsewhere, [the defendants] brought about forbidden results within the
United States."''
The opinion is not wholly satisfying to scholars, but
evidently the Court believed that, apart from the actions of the Mexican

97. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). American Banana was not an act of state case. The case was decided on
the ground that the antitrust laws have no extraterritorial application. Id. at 357. This holding was
substantially overruled in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.; 370 U.S. 690, 704-05
(1962)and then in its entirety by Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,796 (1993). American
Banana's comments on the act of state doctrine are equally suspect following W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 407-08 (1990).
98. 213 U.S. at 357-58. Noting the puzzling nature of this statement, Justice Scalia, in W.S.
Kirkpatrick, stated that Underhill stands fbr "the proposition that a seizureby a state cannot becomplained
of elsewhere-in the sense ofbeing sought to be declared ineffective elsewhere." 493 U.S. at 407. Because
the plaintiff in American Banana "was not trying to undo or disregard the governmental action, but only
obtain damages from private parties who had procured [the action]," the statement arguably implies that
"suit would not lie if a foreign state's actions would be, though not invalidated, impugned." Id.
99. 213 U.S. at 358.
100. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
101. Id. at 276.
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authorities, there were sufficient2 private acts here and abroad to sustain the
1
Justice Department's charges. 1
At this stage of its development, the Act of State Doctrine thus precluded
an American court from questioning the validity of the public actions of a
foreign state committed within its own territory. °3 Any challenge to such
actions, under the American constitutional scheme, should be addressed to the
executive branch and pursued, if at all, through diplomatic channels.0 4 The
courts, in the interests of "the highest considerations of international comity
and expediency,"'0 5 must accept the foreign act as lawful. The rule:
[D]oes not deprive the courts ofjurisdiction once acquired over a case. It requires only
that, when it is made to appear that the foreign government has acted in a given way on
the subject-matter of the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of the result
cannot be questioned but must be Accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision." 6

102. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), did not involve

an act of state issue since plaintiffs' injuries were caused directly by defendants' intervening private (and
noncompelled) acts. Thus, several courts have concluded that Sisal and Continental Ore have not
undermined the act of state holding ofAmerican Banana. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68,
73-75 (2d Cir. 1977); Gen. Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1979). The
Justice Department, however, has argued the contrary. See Briefs for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 76-1403 (Sup. Ct. 1977 Oct. Term), and Mitsui &Co. v. Ind. Inv. Dev. Corp.,
No. 79-552 (Sup. Ct. 1979 Oct. Term).
American Banana, however, was not an act of state case. The Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick stated
that Continental Ore substantially overruled American Banana's holding that the antitrust laws had no
extraterritorial application and whatever American Banana said by way of dictum that might be relevant
to the act of state case before the Court has not survived Sisal. See W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407-08
(1990).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41
(1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443(1) (1987),
which limits the doctrine to the taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory and acts of a
governmental character by a foreign state within its own territory and applicable there. Its applicability to
acts of a foreign government with respect to property outside its own territory, acts by a government not
recognized by the United States, acts allegedly in violation of a treaty, or commercial acts of a foreign
government, such as a breach of contract, has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court.
104. Oetjcn v. Cent. LeatherCo., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918); see also Underhill v. Hemandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
105, Oeten, 246 U.S. at 304-05.
106. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918). See also Timberlane Lumber Co.
v, Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1976) ("A motion to dismiss based on the act of state
doctrine raises such aRule 12(b)(6) objection, not ajurisdictional defect."). See also Callejo v. Bancomer,
S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985) ("the basis ofthe doctrine is not jurisdictional but prudential");
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The law of sovereign immunity
goes to the jurisdiction ofthe court. The act of state doctrine is not jurisdictional."). Accord Allied Bank
Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Accordingly, where a claim directly attackedthe lawfulness of a governmental
action (as in the case against the Venezuelan commander), °7 the Act of State
Doctrine was a complete defense. Similarly, where a suit against a private
party was predicated on a claim that a foreign state had acted wrongfully, as
in American Banana,'0 8 the act of state again defeated the suit.
B. Sabbatino et al,
In three significant cases, all dealing with expropriations by the Cuban
government, the Supreme Court signaled some shifts from the classic
formulation of the Act of State Doctrine. 0 9 The lessons of these cases are not
entirely clear, largely because of widely divided voting in the latter two.
The Court was generally united in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,"0 where it held that the Act of State Doctrine applied even with.
regard to a claim that a foreign expropriation violated customary international
law. The Court declared that the doctrine rested on separation of powers
principles, its basic rationale being the need to avoid judicial action that might
interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by the executive."' However, the
Court specifically rejected "laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and
all-encompassing rule."'" 2 Whether the doctrine should apply in a particular
case should depend on a "balance of relevant considerations," focusing on
whether judicial inquiry into the validity of the foreign state's act would
disturb "the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political
3
branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs."'
The Court may not have had in mind an ad hoc balancing process. Its
decision not to address the validity of the Cuban expropriation was explained
by considerations which would be generally applicable in all expropriation
disputes (principally, the desire not to interfere with executive branch

107. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
108. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
109. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Rep. of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First Nat'l.City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
110. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Only Justice White dissented from Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court.
111. Id. at 423. The Court concluded that the doctrine was based in American law, rather than
derived from principles of international law or comity. Comity nevertheless plays a derivative role, since
the Court explained its separation of powers rationale as necessary to avoid judicial action that would
"hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations
as a whole in the international sphere." Id.
112. Id. at 428.
113. Id. at 427-28.
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negotiations). Nevertheless, Sabbatinoseemed to signal that the judiciary has
greater freedom to apply or reject the doctrine in particular situations than was
true under its traditional formulation.
FirstNat 'l City Bank v. BancoNacionalde Cuba (hereinafter Citibank)'4
involved two factual distinctions from Sabbatino. The American's
expropriation claim was raised as a set-off to a suit by the Cuban government,
and the State Department made affirmative representations that no foreign
policy damage would result if the validity of the expropriation were
adjudicated." 5' There also had been important changes in the Court's
membership since Sabbatino. These factors coalesced to form a slim majority
of the Court prepared to allow adjudication of the particular expropriation." 6
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice White,
concluded that the rationale forjudicial abstention was wholly undercut where
the Executive represented that no foreign policy damage would result if the
courts heard the merits of the case.' While rejecting that rationale, Justice
Douglas concurred because "fair dealing" mandated that a defendant be
allowed to assert any set-off that would reduce or eliminate a foreign state's
claim against him. "8 Justice Powell, appointed to the Court since Sabbatino,
concurred on another ground. He accepted the "balancing of relevant
considerations" approach of Sabbatino, and found that such balancing
weighed in favor of adjudicating Cuban expropriation decrees, absent a
demonstrable countervailing foreign policy consideration." 9
Against this divided majority of five, a solid block of four Justices argued
in dissent that the rationale and conclusion of Sabbatinowere fully applicable
to the Citibankcase. The dangers ofjudicial interference with the Executive's

114.
115.
116.
117.

406 U.S. 759.
Id. at 764.
FirstNat'l City, 406 U.S. 759.
Id. at 768, This view represented an acceptance of the Bernstein exception to the act of state

doctrine, dating from a lower court decision to adjudicate the validity of Nazi seizures of Jewish property
after the court had been informed by the State Department that there were no foreign policy objections to
such adjudication. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaanasche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
In Sabbatino, the Court did not opine on the validity of the Bernstein exception since the executive branch
had argued in favor of application of the Act of State Doctrine. 376 U.S. at 420.
118. 406 U.S. at 770-73. But see Tejarat v. Varsho-Saz, 723 F. Supp. 516, 521 (C.D. Cal. 1989),
holding that a government-owned bank organized under the laws of the Republic of Iran could assert the
Act of State Doctrine to bar an Iranian citizen's set-off defense in an action by the bank alleging that the
defendant fraudulently converted funds from the bank by causing it to wrongfully transfer the funds into
accounts controlled by the defendant.
119. 406 U.S. at 773.
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conduct of foreign policy were present despite the State Department's
judgment to the contrary. 2 0
In Dunhill,' the last of the trilogy, the Court failed to undo the confusion
of Citibank. The petitioner claimed that the Cuban government refused to
return certain monies that petitioner had paid in error to a
government-controlled cigar manufacturer. The payment was for cigars
purchased by petitioner from a company that had subsequently been
expropriated by the Cuban government. Despite amicus urgings by the
executive branch for substantial trimming of the Act of State Doctrine,'22 the
Court could muster a majority for only a very narrow proposition-that the
Cuban government had failed to meet its burden of showing that its refusal to
repay monies to petitioner on the commercial claim amounted to an act of
123
state.
Four justices would have gone further to establish a general commercial
exception to the Act of State Doctrine. 24 Justice Stevens declined to cast his
swing vote for such a rule.22 As in Citibank, a block of four dissenting
Justices would have applied the Act of State Doctrine to bar adjudication over
Cuba's action. 26

120. Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since Justices Douglas and Powel also rejected Justice
Rehnquist's view that the position of the executive branch was conclusive on nonapplication of the Act of
State Doctrine, the Court rejected the Bernstein exception by a six to three vote. Id. at 760. However, at
least one court noted the anomaly of an act of state defense raised in a government enforcement action,
given that the doctrine's rationale is to protect the independence of the executive branch. Assoc. Container
Transp. (Austi.) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 61 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting defense).
121. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Rep. of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
122. The Justice and State Departments argued that the Act of State Doctrine should be abandoned
where it was claimed that a foreign state's act was in violation of international law and, alternatively and
more narrowly, that the doctrine was inapplicable to commercial acts of a foreign state. The 1995
International Guidelines at § 3.33 continue to assert that the act of state does not apply to commercial
activities. See 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 78.
123. 425 U.S. at 694r95 (citation omitted):
[T]he only evidence of an act of state other than the act of nonpayment by interveners was 'a
statement by counsel for the interveners, during trial, that the Cuban Government and the
interveners denied liability and had refused to make repayment.' But this merely restated
respondents' original legal position and added little, if anything, to the proof of an act of state. No
statute, decree, order or resolution of the Cuban Government itself was offered in evidence....
Dunhill, however, "implies that evidence of an official proclamation is not required where the facts (are]
sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct in question was a public act of those with authority to exercise
sovereign powers." Tejarat v. Varsho-Saz, 723 F. Supp. 516, 518 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
124. 425 U.S. at 695-706.
125. Id. at 715. See 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 78, § 3.33.
126. 425 U.S. at 715 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The lessons of this trilogy are limited, but nonetheless important. First,
a strong majority of the Court supports the Sabbatino view that the Act of
State Doctrine imposes no rigid rule against judging the acts of foreign states
in all circumstances. Instead, the rule arises from a need for practical
accommodation between the judicial and executive branches on matters
affecting foreign policy, and this rationale should determine the doctrine's
applicability in particular cases. Second, ad hoc representations by the
executive branch that foreign policy concerns do not require judicial
abstention in particular cases will not be regarded as binding on thejudiciary.
Third, there is some sentiment for a distinction between commercial and
governmental acts in application of the doctrine. However, a majority of the
Court is not yet persuaded. Finally, the executive branch is not likely to argue
for sweeping application of the Act of State Doctrine. "
C. Kirkpatrick
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
clarified the scope of the Act of State Doctrine in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
EnvironmentalTectonics Corp."' At issue in Kirkpatrick was whether the
Act of State Doctrine barred a United States court from entertaining a cause
of action that does not rest upon the asserted invalidity of an official act of a
foreign sovereign, but required imputing to foreign officials an unlawful
motivation in the performance of such an official act.
Environmental Tectonics was an unsuccessful bidder on a military
procurement contract awarded by the Republic of Nigeria. The successful
bidder, Kirkpatrick & Co., had made arrangements with a Nigerian citizen,
whereby the citizen would endeavor to secure the contract for Kirkpatrick.
The Nigerian citizen and Kirkpatrick agreed that, in the event the contract was
awarded to Kirkpatrick, Kirkpatrick would pay two Panamanian entities
controlled by the Nigerian citizen a "commission" equal to twenty percent of
the contract price, which would, in turn, be given as a bribe to officials of the

127. In a substantial number of amicus presentations since Sabbatino, the executive branch has
argued against application of the doctrine. Similarly, Congress has attempted to narrow application ofthe
Act of State Doctrine in expropriation cases, see 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000), although the courts have
construed that effort narrowly. See, e.g., Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Prod. Co., 583 S.W,2d 322 (Tex.
1979). See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 n.2 (2d Cir. 1985)
(applicability of act of state doctrine "may be guided but not controlled by the position, if any, articulated
by the executive ....[W]hether to invoke the ... doctrine is ultimately and always a judicial question.").
128. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
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Nigerian government. Nigerian law prohibited both the payment and the
receipt of bribes in connection with the award of government contracts.'2 9
Environmental Tectonics filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 3 ° the Robinson-Patman Act,' and the
New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act."' Kirkpatrick moved to dismiss on the
ground that the action was barred by the Act of State Doctrine.
The Supreme Court held that the Act of State Doctrine was inapplicable
because nothing in the case required the Court to declare invalid and, thus,
ineffective as a rule of decision for United States courts, the official act of a
foreign sovereign. Under Kirkpatrick,act of state issues arise only when the
outcome of the case turns upon the effect of official action by a foreign
sovereign. Kirkpatrickthus overruled a line of lower cases which applied the
Act of State Doctrine to dismiss cases involving an examination of the motives
of a foreign government in taking action.'33 The Court noted that, in every
case in which the Supreme Court has held the, Act of State Doctrine
applicable, the relief sought or the defense interposed would have required a
United States court to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign
performed in its own territory. 34
' Because the legality of the Nigerian contract
was not a question to be decided in Kirkpatrick, there was no occasion to
apply the rule of decision that the Act of State Doctrine requires. The Court
emphasized that the doctrine does not establish an exception to the Court's
power to decide cases and controversies properly presented to it for those
cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments.' 35 It merely

129. Id. at 402.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
132. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-2 (1995).
133. Many of these discarded cases in fact involved antitrust challenges to the granting or
withholding of oil concession rights in the Middle East. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68,
77 (2d Cir. 1977); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Butte Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 100 (C.D. Cal.
1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).
134. 493 U.S. at 406.
135. Id. at 409. The current version of the Act of State Doctrine thus cannot even be analogized to
the political question doctrine which is a general doctrine ofjusticiability that bars the courts from hearing
cases where there is: 1) a matter that has been constitutionally committed to another branch of government;
2) a lack ofjudicial standards for the resolution of the matter; 3) a decision calling for resolution of policy
questions of a kind clearly calling for nonjudicial discretion; 4) inability to decide the case without
disrepecting other branches of government; 5) an unusual need to follow prior political decision; or 6) the
potential for embarrassment of other branches of government. As Professor Tribe concludes: "The 'act of
state' cases provide perhaps the best illustration both of the uses and of its rejection of political question
analysis in the foreign affairs context." I LAURENCE H.TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 373 n.44
(3d ed. 2000). But cf 767 Third Avenue Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Yugo., 218 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2000)
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requires that, in the process of deciding such cases, the acts of foreign
sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid. 36
Kirkpatrickthus drove a stake through the key portions of the original OPEC
Ninth Circuit decision which applied the Act of State Doctrine because of the
potential of embarrassing the executive branch by analogy to the domestic
political question doctrine. 3 '
Kirkpatrickand its progeny further leave open the possibility of holding
that the Sabbatino balancing process may in some cases override an act of
state defense even where the validity of the foreign act is at issue. 3 ' The
increasing hostility of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches toward
the Act of State Doctrine in recent years has encouraged the judiciary to reject
the defense when raised post-Kirkpatrick'39 and bodes poorly if raised again
in the OPEC context.
D. Specific Limitationson the Doctrine
There are a number of potential exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine,
even in the limited circumstances where it applies at all. The potential
exception for commercial activities is the most relevant for any renewed
14°
consideration of OPEC's position under United States antitrust law.
While the issue has not yet been resolved by the Supreme Court, the
doctrine will probably be held inapplicable to commercial acts of a state.
Justice White was undoubtedly correct in his plurality opinion in Dunhill
which stated that "subjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their
commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of affronting their
sovereignty than would an attempt to pass on the legality of their
governmental acts.'' Congress endorsed this basic judgment in the FSIA of
1976, which subjected foreign sovereigns to the possibility of suit for their
commercial acts so long as there was a requisite impact on United States

(in non-act of state context, political question doctrine used to dismiss suit seeking to determine and
allocate successor liability for former Yugoslavian consulate debt).

136.
137.
138.
139.

493 U.S. at 409,
See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1981).
See, e.g., Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, 20 F.3d 1224 (3d Cir. 1994).
See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).

140. Standard formulations of the Act of State Doctrine contain an exception foracts outside the
territory of the foreign sovereign and for public acts that were the product of corruption. See WALLER,
ANTITRUST, supra note 43, § 8.13. Neither of these exceptions appear to relate to OPEC's conduct
141. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Rep, of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703-04 (1976).
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commerce. 42 The Justice and State Departments have also maintained that the
Act of State Doctrine should not apply to commercial acts.143 Thus, one must

and governmental acts will
predict that the distinction between commercial
44
prove relevant in the act of state area.1

142. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000). See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text. The House
Report encouraged the judiciary to apply this distinction to the Act of State Doctrine. H.R. REP. No.
94-1487, at 20 n. 1(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6619 n.1. In dictum, one court has stated
that the question of whether the Act of State Doctrine embraces commercial acts should now be considered
"in light of the congressional enactment ofthe FSIA." Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384,
398 n.28 (D. Del. 1978). The court concluded, in any event, that the Act of State Doctrine is not applicable
to acts of a government-owned commercial entity. Id. at 398.
143. See 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 78, § 3.33; 1977 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra
note 77, at 55; Letterfrom MonroeLeigh, LegalAdviser ofthe Department of State, to the Solicitor General
(Nov. 26, 1976), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, 425 U.S. at 706. The 1988 Department of Justice
Guidelines do not take a position on the existence of a commercial acts exception to the Act of State
Doctrine.
144. The court in Dominicus Americana Bohiov. Gulf& Western Indus., 473 F. Sopp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), appeared ready to conclude that commercial acts were not within the doctrine, although it found the
existing record insufficient for a final ruling. Id. at 689-90. The court read Hunt as adopting this position
in dictum, although it is not clear that the Second Circuit intended to go that far. Id. at 690. See also Hunt
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68,73 (2d Cir. 1977). In Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex,
Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1982), the court discounted Dominicus as a misreading of Hunt.
Moreover, in Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit expressly
rejected the contention that Hunt had adopted the commercial-activity exception: "We leave for another
day consideration of the possible existence in this Circuit of a commercial exception to the act of state
doctrine under Dunhill." Id. at 225.
In contrast, the court in General Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1979),
applied the Act of State Doctrine in refusing to examine the motivations behind fixeign government
procurement decisions. Similarly, in applying the doctrine in a dispute over foreign governmental
procurement of military fighter aircraft, another court characterized theplaintiff's claim as requiring it "to
inquire into sensitive questions of vital concern of the military security of those foreign governments."
Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1112, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1980). Under the
commercial/governmental line drawn in the FSIA, procurement normally falls within the commercial
category.
GeneralAircrafl and the district court ruling in Northrop were criticized and found not controlling
in Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 910-11 (E.D. Mich. 1981). That antitrust case
involved claims that the defendant used illegal kickbacks to sell armored cars and parts to foreign
governments, driving plaintiff from the market. The court observed that the FSIA had permitted suits
against foreign sovereigns on military procurement contracts and found no basis for believing that foreign
policy problems would arise from adjudicating plaintiff's claim. In Williams v. Curtiss- Wright Corp., 694
F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982), the court agreed with General Aircraft and the Northrop district court that military
procurement was not within the commercial activity exception, but the court nevertheless held that the
balancing test did not mandate application of the Act of State Doctrine under the particular facts. Similarly,
the lower court's ruling in Northrop was reversed on appeal on this same ground. Northrop Corp. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1047-49 (9th Cir. 1983). Several decisions expressly declined
to resolve whether to adopt a commercial activity exception to the Act of State Doctrine. See, e.g., Callejo
v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1115 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka, 762 F.2d at 225.
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This does not answer the question of how to distinguish between
commercial and governmental acts for this purpose. The standard set forth in
the FSIA focuses on the nature, rather than the purpose, of the conduct in
question.'45 This same approach was applied for act of state purposes in
litigation, where the court concluded that Brazil's denial of import permits
was within the doctrine since it was the sort of conduct normally performed
by governments rather than by private parties.'46 It could be argued that the
separation of powers rationale of the Act of State Doctrine and its deference
to state actions "giv[ing] effect to its public interests"'47 tend toward greater
emphasis on purpose rather than nature. But this would seem to question
congressional judgments made in the FSIA, where similar policy arguments
pertain, and for convenience alone there is likely to be a strong desire among
judges to apply the same standards under both the Act of State Doctrine and
the FSIA.'4 8

VI.

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION DEFENSE

The OPEC defendants would not be able to take advantage of another
frequently discussed, but seldom litigated, special defense in international
antitrust litigation. The foreign sovereign compulsion defense may provide

145. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2000).
146. Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The nature
test was applied in Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
There the court held that "[g]ranting a concession to exploit natural resources entails an exercise of powers
peculiar to a sovereign" because such an action "[w]ould not have been taken by a private citizen." 712
F.2d at 408. See also Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1116; Braka, 762 F.2d at 225; Sage Int'l, 534 F. Supp. at 905.
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41

(1965).
148. See Letelier v. Rep. of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665,674 (D.D.C. 1980) (to construe the Act of State
Doctrine differently from the FSIA "would totally emasculate the purpose and effectiveness of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act by permitting a foreign state to reimpose [through the act of state doctrine] the
so recently supplanted framework of sovereign immunity as defined prior to the Act."). See also SageInt 7,
534 F. Supp. at 906-08 (while not adopting the "mechanical" commercial exception of the FSIA, a court
applying the Act ofState Doctrine should give deferenceto the legislative preference for a narrow doctrine).
But see Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted):
The act of state doctrine is not diluted by the commercial activity exception which limits the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. While purely commercial activity may not rise to the level of an
act of state, certain seemingly commercial activity will trigger act of state considerations.... While
the [Immunities Act] ignores the underlying purpose ofa state's action, the act of state doctrine does
not .... Because the act of state doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign immunity address different
concems and apply in different circumstances, we find that the act of state doctrine remains
available when [judicial] caution is appropriate, regardless of any commercial component of the
activity involved.
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a safe harbor for a private defendant who has been compelled to engage in
conduct which violates United States antitrust law. While the contours and
exceptions of the defense are hotly debated,"4 9 the defense has only been
successful once 5 ' and has been otherwise rejected in each case because the
court determined that the defendants acted pursuant to the advice,
encouragement, or prodding of a foreign government but had not been subject
to outright compulsion.' 5 ' Whatever comfort this defense may provide, it has
no application in the OPEC context, since it is the behavior of the foreign
governments themselves that is being examined and not that of private firms
stuck between the rock of OPEC's commands and the hard place of United
States antitrust law.
VII. THE GUTTING OF COMITY
Sovereign immunity, the act of state, through all of its protean
transformations, and the foreign compulsion defense all derive much of their
analytical heft from the underlying doctrine of international comity, the
respect and deference a sovereign nation must show to the actions and
important interests of a fellow sovereign.
In the antitrust context, for a time, comity became a separate basis for not
asserting or exercising jurisdiction over a case which placed the United States
in conflict with another nation. Here too, the Supreme Court has recently
gutted the doctrine of virtually all of its vitality and made it unlikely that
comity alone would enable a district court to abstain or decline jurisdiction in
an antitrust suit against the OPEC nations.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Fire Ins. v.
California,' it seemed likely that the Timberlane'" approach, which
deemphasizes the effects test in favor of a more complex and multivariable
comity analysis, would be influential, if not controlling, in foreign commerce
litigation. The HartfordFire litigation began with a series of state attorneys
general bringing an antitrust challenge against a group of insurance
companies, reinsurance companies, underwriters, brokers, individuals, and the
Insurance Services Office. The complaint alleged that the defendants

149. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S.
Antitrust Law: The JapaneseAuto Restraints andBeyond, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747 (1982).
150. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
151. See generally WALLER, ANTiTRUST, supra note 43, § 8.19-21.
152. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
153. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
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conspired to eliminate certain forms of insurance coverage in the United
States and engaged in boycotts and other forms of intimidation to enforce their
conspiracy. A number of the defendants were located in England and had
acted in a manner which was lawful under English law and the Lloyd's
insurance exchange rules. These defendants moved to dismiss the counts
against them on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and,
alternatively, on comity grounds.'54
The district court proceeded to analyze the question of whether to
exercise jurisdiction based on comity utilizing the Ninth Circuit's Timberlane
standard.' While the court analyzed all seven of the factors set forth in
Timberlane, the real focus was on the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy. The court held that the degree of conflict between United States
antitrust and English law and policy was "substantial" based on: the nature
of English regulation of the insurance industry and the Lloyd's insurance
market; England's unmitigated hostility toward the extraterritorial application
of United States antitrust law; and the passage and enforcement of the British
blocking statute, the Protection of Trading Interests Act.' 56 Following a quick
rush through the other Timberlanefactors, many of which weighed against the
exercise of jurisdiction, the court concluded that: "the conflict with English
law and policy which would result from the extra-territorial application of the
antitrust laws in this case are not outweighed by other factors."'5
The Ninth Circuit applied the same basic framework, but reached a
different conclusion.' The Ninth Circuit held that once conduct has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on American commerce it will
be "only in an unusual case that comity will require abstention from the
exercise of jurisdiction."' 59 The court agreed that there was a significant

154. Har(ford Fire, 509 U.S. at 769.'
155. Timberlane required the analysis of "the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the
nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the principal ...places of business of corporations, the extent
to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is an explicit
purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseability of such effect, and the relative importance
to the violations charged of conduct within the United States compared with conduct abroad." Id. at 614.
156. See generally WALLER, ANTITRUST, supra note 43, § 4.17 for a more extensive discussion of
blocking statutes.
157. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464,490 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
158. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit also embarked on
an unnecessary analysis ofthe Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA"), concluding probably
erroneously that the FTAIA supported the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, but concluded, probably
correctly, that the FTAIA did not affect the subsequent comity analysis. Id. at 931-32.
159. Id. at 932.
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conflict with English law and policy, but that every other factor, especially the
significance of the effects and the intent to affect
the United States, counseled
1 60
jurisdiction.
of
exercise
the
heavily toward
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in a 5-4 decision which
diminished, if not eliminated, the role of comity.' 6' In the brief portion of the
opinion that dealt with the foreign defendants, Justice Souter first dismissed
the contention that the United States courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
stating: "[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States.' 62
The Court then focused on the question of whether international comity
counseled against the exercise of jurisdiction in the case before it. The
majority held that the only substantial question was whether there was a "true
conflict between domestic and foreign law."' 63 The Court then held that there
was no "true" conflict because the defendants were not required by English
law to violate the Sherman Act and were able to comply with both English and
American law.' 64 Thus, in the majority's view, there was no conflict
warranting abstention on comity grounds. Having raised and disposed of the
defendants' argument in a single paragraph, the Court concluded by stating
that there was "no need in this litigation to address other considerations that
might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise ofjurisdiction on grounds
6
of international comity."'

160. Id. at 933-34.
161. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
162. Id. at 796.
163. Id. at 798 (citing Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). According to prominent
commentators, Justice Souter's "true conflict" test was simply a misreading of the Arospatiole case and
the Restatement (Third)of ForeignRelations Law ofthe UnitedStates cited by Justice Souter. See Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing ofInterests, and the Exercise ofJurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections
on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 Am.J. INT'L L. 42 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritorialityin an
Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SuP. CT. Rv.289.
164. 509 U.S. at 799. The Department of Justice had previously defined a true conflict more broadly.
In the 1988 International Guidelines, the Department asserted that: "A true conflict may arise, however,
if anticompetitive conduct within the jurisdiction of the U.S. antitrust laws is encouraged or promoted by
the law or policy of a foreign sovereign." U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm., ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 5 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES]. The Department ofJustice took the narrower position ultimately adopted by the Court in its
amicus brief in the HartfordFire litigation and largely relied on the language from HartfordFire in the
1995 Guidelines. See 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 78, § 3.2.
165. 509 U.S. at 799.
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Justice Scalia countered the majority's brevity on the subject of comity
with an extensive dissent. First, Justice Scalia agreed that the federal district
court had subject matter jurisdiction since the plaintiff had asserted nonfrivolous claims under the Sherman Act, raising a proper federal question
vesting the Court with subject matterjurisdiction.'66 He then characterized the
question of the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act as a question of
substantive law of whether "Congress asserted regulatory power over the
'
challenged conduct."167
Justice Scalia grudgingly agreed with the majority
that, at least as a matter of precedent, if not logic, "it is now well established
that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially."' 68
Justice Scalia then based the remainder of his analysis on a second canon
of statutory constriction-that an act of Congress should be construed to
comply with international law whenever possible. 69 He argued that a
consideration of comity was necessary in order to apply the Sherman Act
extraterritorially in accordance with international law. 7 ° Justice Scalia
applied the reasonableness test of the Restatenent (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States as a reasonably accurate guide to
international law requirements of comity. 7 ' Justice Scalia ultimately
concluded that the Sherman Act did not cover the activity of the defendants
at issue in the litigation, regardless of whether there was some nominal or
potential way that the defendants could have complied with both regulatory
regimes.'
The majority opinion in HartfordFirecan be read broadly to eliminate
virtually all assertions of international comity as a defense in United States
antitrust litigation. Read literally, HartfordFirewould balance the interests
of the United States regulatory regime (antitrust) against foreign law and
policy only where there was a "true conflict" and the defendants could not
comply with one set of laws without violating the other country's law.'73
Comity would then be reduced to the level of the almost-never successful

166. Id. at 812 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 813.
168. Id. at 814.
169. Id. at 814-15.
170. Id. at 817-18.
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONSLAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987).
Justice Scalia was carefl to note that he was not necessarily adopting the precise formulations of the
Restatement in ev'y detail, but that his results would be the same "under virtually any conceivable [comity]
test that takes account of foreign regulatory interests." 509 U.S. at 818.
172. 509 U.S. at 820-21.
173. Id. at 798-99.
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foreign sovereign compulsion defense.'74 Worse yet, even in the event of
outright compulsion, the courts might balance the respective national interests
and proceed despite the defendant's proof that compliance with United States
antitrust laws would have required violation of another country's laws.
Regardless of the flaws in HartfordFire,it remains the law of the land
until such time as the Supreme Court revisits the issue and reaches a different
result. 7 ' The early results suggest that either Hartford Fire was too
ambiguous to adequately guide the lower courts, or at a more fundamental
level, that HartfordFiredid not "take" and the lower courts are engaged in a
campaign of guerilla warfare to allow a more robust role for comity while
paying lip service to the holding of HartfordFire and its key concept of a
"true conflict."
The Ninth Circuit treated extraterritoriality as if Hartford Fire never
really existed in Metro Industries v. Sammi Corp.'76 The case involved
allegations that the foreign defendant and others used exclusive design rights
under Korean law to divide markets and exclude the plaintiff-importer from
selling in the United States. The court first announced the somewhat startling
conclusion that wholly foreign conduct would be examined under the rule of
reason, even if the behavior in question would normally be treated as per se
77
unreasonable in a domestic commerce case.1
The court then dealt with the question of jurisdiction and comity by
adhering to the jurisdictional rule of reason announced in Timberlane. The
Court balanced all seven of the Timberlane factors. It found no conflict
between national policies since the Korean policy did not compel the
anticompetitive conduct alleged in the complaint.' It spent little time on the

174. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970)
for the only successful application of the foreign compulsion defense in an antitrust case. See supra notes
148-50 and accompanying text.
175. in this regard, it is important to note that the decision was a 5-4 decision and Justices White and
Blackmun, two members of Justice Souter's majority, subsequently left the Court.
176. 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996).
177. Id. at 844-45. The only support cited by the court for the proposition that the standard for
substantive illegality, rather than jurisdiction, changes in foreign commerce cases is a portion ofthe Areeda
and Turner treatise. Id. at 845, citing 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 237
(1978). This is a distinctly minority position that has been rejected by most sources except for the 1977
version of the Antitrust Division's International Guidelines and a dissent by Justice Frankfurter in Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593,605 (1951); see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
DIvISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 2-3 (1977). See generally WALLER,
ANTITRUST, supra note 43, § 7.12-.13.
178. 82 F.3d at 847.
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other factors except to note: "Considering all the factors, principles of comity
and fairness do not deprive this court of jurisdiction."' 9
While reaching a result in keeping with HartfordFire,the Ninth Circuit
also announced virtual defiance of the Supreme Court and stated that:
While Hartford Fire Ins. overruled our holding in Timberlane 1Ithat a foreign
government's encouragement ofconduct which the United States prohibits would amount
to a conflict of law, it did not question the propriety of the jurisdictional rule of reason
or the seven comity factors set forth in Timberlane I '

In its Nippon Paperdecision, the First Circuit showed greater fidelity to
the majority opinion in HartfordFire.'8 ' Although Nippon Paperconcerned
the question of extraterritoriality itself, and not comity, the First Circuit
nonetheless adopted the conventional view of the HartfordFiremajority and
stated:
Comity concerns would operate to defeat the exercise ofjurisdiction only in those few
cases in which the law of foreign sovereign required a defendant to act in a manner
incompatible
with the Sherman Act or in which full compliance with both statutory
schemes was impossible."
2

Senior Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York has played a key role in the interpretation
of HartfordFire. He issued two decisions dismissing different complaints on
comity grounds without any clear showing of the kind of true conflict
contemplated by Justice Souter's majority opinion.' 3
In Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom,'84 the plaintiff sued a publicly
owned French telecommunication company for monopolizing certain markets
for the sale of subscriber information by refusing to sell the plaintiff-customer
information in a particular form. Judge Haight had no difficulty holding that
subject matter jurisdiction was present because of the direct, substantial and
foreseeable effects of the defendant's conduct in the United States.'. He then

179. Id.
180. Id. at 846 n.5.
181. United States v. Nippon Paper Industries, 109 F.3d 1(1st Cir. 1997).
182. Id. at 8.
183. Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom, 978 F. Supp. 464 (D.N.Y. 1997); Trugman-Nash, Inc. v.
New Zealand Dairy Bd., 954 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev 'gupon reconsideration,942 F. Supp. 905
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
184. 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
185. Id. at 483.
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found that he was bound by the jurisdictional rule of reason analysis in
8 6
Timberlane as the governing law of the Second Circuit.
Judge Haight then addressed whether Hartford Fire changed the
application of Timberlane. 8s7In light of the language ofHartfordFireand the
subsequent holdings on comity within the Second Circuit, Judge Haight had
little choice but to conclude that "a party seeking the dismissal of a Sherman
Act case on the grounds of international comity must first demonstrate that a
true conflict exists between the Sherman Act and relevant foreign law."' " He
then concluded that only after the threshold of a true conflict was passed
would the court examine the familiar Timberlane factors.' 89
Judge Haight believed that the issue of how to determine whether or not
a true conflict existed within the meaning of HartfordFirewas a question of
first impression. 9 ' Most peculiarly, the court held that it could only conclude
that French law may require what the Sherman Act may forbid, but this was
sufficient to proceed with, and to satisfy, the comity analysis under
Timberlane.' Judge Haight then concluded that the other Timberlanefactors
favored dismissal and did not require elaborate discussion.'92 Although Judge
Haight's rather transparent defiance of HartfordFirewas promptly reversed
by the Second Circuit,' he ultimately dismissed the litigation again on
remand under the FSIA. 194
The use of comity in Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. New ZealandDairy Bd. was
even more complicated.'"3 There, the dispute centered around the role of the
governmentally created dairy board in the export of cheese for sale in the
United States. Judge Haight accepted the teachings ofHartfordFirein a more
straightforward way and characterized the issue as whether New Zealand law

186. Id. at 473.
187. He also considered whether the FTAIA required any change in the Timberlane analysis but
concluded that it did not. Id. at 478-79.
188. Id. at 478.
189. Id.
190. In HartfordFire Ins. v. California,the parties agreed that no such conflict was present. 509
U.S. 764, 799 (1993). In a Second Circuit decision involving international comity in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the parties stipulated that such a conflict was present. In re Maxwell Communication Corp.,
93 F.3d 1036, 1049 (2d Cir. 1996).
191. 978 F. Supp. at 478-79.
192. Id. at 481.
193. Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom, S.A., 157 F.3d 922 (2d Cir. 1998).
194. Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom, S.A. 2001-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,228 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(holding that the defendant's commercial activity lacked the substantial effect on the United States as
required under 28 U.S.C. § 1605).
195. See Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. New Zealand Dairy Bd., 954 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), revg
upon reconsideration,942 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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compelled the defendants to act in a way that violated American antitrust
' The court then analyzed the text ofthe New Zealand Dairy Board Act
law. "96
of 1961 and concluded:
[T]he most that can be said for the defendant Board is that the New Zealand Parliament
established a statutory scheme confering comprehensive powers upon it, and that the
Board's conduct alleged here is perfectly consistent with New Zealand law and policy.

That is the showing made by the English reinsurers in Hartford;but, as that case holds,
it is not sufficient to create a conflict with American antitrust law. 97

On reconsideration, Judge Haight reached the opposite conclusion and
ultimately dismissed the complaint.'9 " First, he concluded that the practical
effect of the 1961 Dairy Board Act required the prohibition of the sales at
issue in the litigation, thus creating a true conflict under HartfordFire.9 9 He
further held, more questionably, that the existence of a true conflict was not
the only consideration underHartfordFireand that controlling Second Circuit
law required him to apply the full range of Timberlane factors (presumably
defining true conflict in accordance with HartfordFire).° ° Without further
analysis, he concluded that those factors pointed in the direction of declining
jurisdiction."'
Outside the antitrust area, the courts have also applied comity expansively
despite the language of Hartford Fire. For example, both the district court
and the Second Circuit in In re Maxwell Communications Corp., relied on
notions of comity to hold that English, rather than American, law would
govern the avoidance of certain transactions at issue in the bankruptcy
proceedings. In the district court opinion, Judge Scheindlin relied on Justice
Scalia's dissent in HartfordFire for the proposition that "comity is 'wholly
independent' of the presumption against extraterritoriality and applied even
202
if the presumption has been overcome or is otherwise inapplicable.9
Moreover, the court stated that HartfordFiredid not apply inthe bankruptcy
context and that the Bankruptcy Code did not impose the kind of regulatory
regime that governs conduct in the same manner as the antitrust laws.2" 3 Thus,

196. 942 F. Supp. at 909.
197. Id. at 912-13.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Trugman-Nash, 954 F. Supp. at 734.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.
Id.
In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 186 B.R. 807, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 823-24.
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the court concluded that HartfordFire did not bar the use of comity to dismiss
the complaint.
The Second Circuit reached the same result, but used very different and
less inflammatory reasoning. °4 The Second Circuit relied on Justice Souter's
notion of a "true conflict," but held that such a conflict existed between
United States and English bankruptcy law based upon the parties' agreement
that American and English bankruptcy avoidance law would produce different
and conflicting results with respect to the transaction at issue.2" 5 The court
then affirmed the dismissal of the case based on comity on the grounds that
England's interest had "primacy" using the factors set forth in the Timberlane
decision." 6
The Second Circuit took a similarly expansive view of comity in the
trademark context in Sterling Drug,Inc. v. Bayer A G.2 7 In a case where the
opposing parties both held rights in the same trademark under the laws of the
United States and Germany, the court held that HartfordFiredid not bar the
application of international comity even though no true conflict existed. In
dismissing the complaint on the grounds that United States' interests were
secondary to those of Germany in the dispute, the court relied on the language
of HartfordFire,where the Supreme Court noted that it had not addressed
"other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise
of jurisdiction on grounds of international comity.""2 °
The executive branch has taken an additional swipe at comity beyond the
damage done in HartfordFire. In both the 1988 and 1995 International
Antitrust Guidelines, the Antitrust Division, joined by the FTC in 1995,
pledged to take comity into account in the exercise of their prosecutorial
discretion, but contend that comity does not apply once the government
decides to bring an enforcement action.0 9 The Agencies believe that comity
is based entirely on separation of powers rationale and that the courts should
not "second-guess the executive branch's judgment as to the proper role of
comity."2 " The government's support for this dubious proposition is thin.2"'

204. See In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F,3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
205. Id. at 1050.
206. Id. at 1051.
207. See 14 F.3d 733, 746 (2d Cir. 1994).
208. Hartford Fire Ins. v. Calif., 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993).
209. See 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, sypra note 78, § 3.2; 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES,
supra note 164, § 5 n. 167.
210. 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 78, § 3.2.
211. See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.5 (D.D.C. 1990), affd on other
grounds, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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However, in the real world, few courts will have both the courage and the
record evidence to overturn a carefully well-defended decision by the
Agencies to bring a foreign commerce antitrust case, OPEC included.
The death of comity is more pronounced in the Supreme Court than in the
lower courts. Nonetheless, the plain holding of HartfordFire,and most of its
subsequent application by the lower courts, suggest that comity is no longer
a powerful or convenient tool for avoiding deciding the merits of cases the
courts would rather not have to decide.
VIII. WHY PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW DOES NOT SAVE THE OPEC
NATIONS IN UNITED STATES COURT

The question ofthe legality of OPEC's conduct under public international
law requires consideration of a series of ambiguous doctrines without
definitive answers.212 Even if those questions are ultimately resolved in
OPEC's favor, they do not provide a barrier to suit in United States courts.
The most frequently asserted defenses under international law depend on
principles of public international law embodied in the alleged approval of
OPEC by the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,' 3 and the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.214 Despite language in these
instruments that arguably ratifies the activities of OPEC, these instruments
must be viewed as traditional United Nations instruments which are nonbinding and do not by themselves constitute international law.
Nor can these pronouncements be viewed as stating principles of
customary international law. They did not nearly receive universal acceptance
at the time of their passage, and certainly not for the kind of absolute rule that
would insulate OPEC from all forms of municipal legal liability.215 Over the

212. In 1975, Joelson and Griffin came to the same conclusion as to the ambiguity of international
law but phrased their conclusion differently. "For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the various
contradictory contentions are evidence that the status of the Arabs' activities under public international law
is unsettled and may not presently fall within any of the recognized categories of illegal international
conduct." Joelson & Griffin, supra note 1,at 638.
213. G.A. Res. 3171 U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No, 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9400 (1973),
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974).
214. G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974),
reprintedin 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 102-03

(1987) (rule of customary international law requires nearly unanimous acceptance as binding rule by
community of nations).
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intervening thirty years, the support for these propositions has waned as nation
after nation has privatized its extractive industries, adopted more marketoriented economies and legal systems, adopted antitrust principles of its own,
and begun to explore the international enforcement of these laws.
Closely related to this argument is the contention that OPEC enjoys
immunity from municipal liability as either a lawful international commodity
agreement or as a producers' association. These arguments are best addressed
by Mark Joelson and the late Joseph Griffin, both highly sophisticated
international antitrust practitioners who frequently defended foreign
governments and firms and who by no means represent knee-jerk apologists
for U.S. antitrust policy. In their analysis of a possible defense for OPEC
under international law, they concluded:
It should be noted that there is no intergovernmental commodity agreement for oil as
there is for other commodities, and that traditional commodity agreements, i.e.,
multilateral agreements that provide for special arrangements beyond normal market
mechanisms, can be distinguished from producer cartels. In the former, producer and
consumer governments agree--often on the basis of political rather than business
considerations-to manage the supply and price of a particular commodity for their
mutual advantage. On the other hand, a producer cartel is an agreement among members
of one side of the producer-consumer population to fix prices or control production for
its own advantage regardless of the effect of consumers,2

All of these contentions are unresolved since the rise of OPEC as an
economic force and are unlikely to resolved at the international level. More
importantly for our purposes, they are simply irrelevant. While international
law is part of the law of the United States,217 Congress can enact a statute in
violation of international law that must be enforced within the United States
if it chooses to do so.2"' A United States court must therefore apply the law
set down by Congress even if it results in a violation of public international
law and the liability of the United States as a nation at the international
level. 2 9
Congress has charged the courts with subject matter jurisdiction to
enforce the antitrust laws and, to the extent that it chose to limit that
jurisdiction in light of international law concerns, it did so in the FSIA.22 ° The

216. Joelson & Griffin, supra note 1,at 640.
217. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF THE FOREIGNRELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITEDSTATES, §

115(1987).

219. Id.
220. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611).
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FSIA was enacted after the rise of OPEC, passage of various United Nations
pronouncements, and both the embargoes and price increases which marked
the first energy crisis. Regardless of whether the United States was ever held
responsible by an international tribunal or other body, the courts are free,
indeed duty-bound, to apply the statutory law of the United States.
IX. WHY PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT GET RICH

One important difference between the first and second OPEC decisions
is that the second case involved only a request for declaratory and injunctive
relief. Assuming that OPEC is not currently planning to radically change its
modus operandi because of the potential for an injunction entered in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, why then
the litigation strategy to forego the main weapon in private antitrust litigation,
namely the treble damage remedy which was alleged even in the first OPEC
case?
The answer lies in intervening developments in the substance of antitrust
doctrine rather than in the special international litigation defenses involving
sovereign nations that are the principal focus of this article. However, to
make sense of the strategy in Prewitt and to identify the right plaintiff in
future cases against OPEC, a short discussion of what is referred to as the
indirect purchaser doctrine is necessary."'
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois which
held that only plaintiffs who dealt directly with defendants violating the
antitrust laws could sue for treble damages under the federal antitrust laws.222
The Court based its decision on the need to protect defendants from
inconsistent verdicts and possibly multiple recoveries, as well as the need to
protect the courts from overly burdensome and lengthyproceedings to allocate
damages among plaintiffs at different levels of the distribution chain.223 The
Court permitted exceptions for cost plus contracts and situations where the
defendant and the direct purchaser were corporate affiliates or co-conspirators,
but these exceptions have been narrowly construed in subsequent decisions224
and do not appear to apply in the OPEC context.

221. See generally2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
2000); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 16.6 (2d ed. 1999).
222. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
223. Id. at 730-33.
224. Kansas v. Utilicorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
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The Court has subsequently made clear that Illinois Brick only interprets
the Clayton Act, afederalantitrust statute. 2 5 Thus, the states are free to allow
indirect purchaser suits under state antitrust law, which the majority of large
states have done.226 Similarly, indirect purchaser suits, or their functional
equivalents, may be available under federal antitrust laws other than the
Clayton Act.227
All of this is critical because virtually no purchaser of gasoline in the
United States qualifies as a direct purchaser under Illinois Brick. There are
of course no direct purchasers from OPEC itself since it does not own or sell
petroleum products. It is an international organization which is a forum for
petroleum producing nations to set production levels and hence the price of
oil. The direct purchasers from the OPEC nations are various state run or
private oil companies which have entered into contractual arrangements with
the governments.228 By the time gasoline is refined, transported, wholesaled,
and sold to the consumer at the pump, a whole set of distribution levels have
been used, raising the precise problems that animated Illinois Brick in the first
place.
The implications of Illinois Brick leave private plaintiffs with the
following options. The direct purchasers would have standing under Illinois
Brick to bring treble damage actions against the OPEC member states (or at
least their state owned instrumentalities), but they are unlikely to do so for
business reasons. Suing your principal supplier would be suicidal, especially
when in all likelihood any overcharges are passed on to customers further
down the chain of distribution. It is no coincidence that no major international
oil company has sued its supplier nation on antitrust grounds.229 The only
challenges to OPEC have come from a union and a gas station operator either
unconnected to or far down on the supply chain.230

225. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
226. See Richard Wolfram & Spencer Weber Waller, Contemporary AntitrustFederalism: Cluster
Bombs or Rough Justice?, in N.Y. STATE ANTITRUST L. 3 (2d ed. 2002), available at www.luc.edu/
schools/law/antitrust/docs/federalf.pdf (last visited Dqc. 20, 2002).
227. FTC v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 1999) (interpreting suits for
disgorgement under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
228. EVANS, supra note 1, at 139-41; Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 561
(C.D. Cal. 1979).
229. In contrast, antitrust litigation has been instituted by several smaller disfavored oil companies
who reached the point where there was nothing to lose by suing once their concessions had been terminated
or awarded to rival companies. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir, 1977); Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 197 1), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.
1977).
230. Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v. OPEC, 2001-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,246; Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
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While indirect purchasers would be barred from federal treble damage
suits, they could seek injunctive relief in federal courts as the class plaintiffs
231 Such suits remain unattractive to most plaintiffs and their
did in Prewitt.
counsel since, by definition, they do not seek monetary relief and at best
prevailing plaintiffs would be reimbursed their counsel fees as a prevailing
party under the Clayton Act.232 We are left with a small group of potential
plaintiffs consisting of the adventurous, the wealthy, and the publicity seekers
who at the end of the day may get an injunction, but little means to enforce the
injunction through the normal means of the contempt process or to ultimately
affect the price or supply of petroleum.
The states and private parties would have better luck under state antitrust
laws on Illinois Brick grounds. State attorneys general have the statutory
ability to represent the state as a buyer and to represent natural persons within
the state in a parenspatriecapacity. This, combined with the fact that most
states have passed anIllinoisBrick repealer permitting indirect purchaser suits
under state antitrust laws, means that there would be standing to bring either
a private or state governmental treble damage antitrust action against OPEC
member nations. This suit could even be brought in federal court assuming
there were grounds for federal jurisdiction as either a diversity action23 3 or as
a supplemental claim to some other federal question (i.e. a Clayton Act suit
for injunction).234 Yet there remain troubling constitutional questions which
make the states and citizens suing under their laws, imperfect enforcers
against OPEC.
X.

WHY THE STATES AND STATE ANTITRUST STATUTES SHOULD NOT

GET INVOLVED

State attorneys general have very different incentives from other private
plaintiffs. While private plaintiffs may be faulted for being insensitive to the
political ramifications of their actions, the opposite may be true for state
attorneys general. They are elected officials who must take into account the
political ramifications for all of their actions. However, those considerations
are inherently local and are likely to be unresponsive to the concerns of

v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. CaL 1979), aff'd on othergrounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
231. Prewitt, 2001-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,246.
232. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 221, IM325-27; 1 Am. BAR ASSOC., SECT.
OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (FOURTH) 758-60, 795-801, 909-16 (1997).
233. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
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citizens of other states, the nation as a whole, or the citizens and governments
of foreign nations.
The states and private parties suing under state law understandably view
things quite differently. Historically, state enforcement substantially preceded
the enactment of the Sherman Act itself.2. The states' ability to sue on their
own behalf and on behalf of their citizens is enshrined in federal legislation.236
Their ability to enact their own state antitrust statutes and empower their
officials and private parties to sue under them flows from their sovereign
status under the Constitution. The states further point to important antitrust
litigation where either the states acted before the federal government or where
the federal government took no action at all. 37 They also point to the
efficiency enhancing aspects of pooling resources and of collective
investigation and prosecution of nationwide cases. 3 Finally, the states have
always argued, and it has long been considered one of the mainstays of
antitrust federalism, that the state attorneys general are more sensitively
attuned to the issues affecting the citizens of their states than the federal
antitrust agencies can be.239 In some respects they can, therefore, better
represent the public interest, even at the risk of coming under the sway of
interest groups representing competitors of a potential antitrust defendant. As
the economy has become globalized, and antitrust issues jump state and
national borders, it is not surprising that state attorneys general have become
more involved in matters that formerly would have been considered the sole,
or at least primary, jurisdiction of the federal enforcement agencies.24 °
The mixed and conflicting incentives of state attorneys general and
private plaintiffs under state law in the antitrust area are merely a subset of the
general problem of state and local lawmaking and law enforcement which can

235. See James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional
and ConceptualReach of State Antitrust Law, 1880.1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495 (1987).
236. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000).
237. One prominent example is Hartford Fire Ins, Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (antitrust
suit by nineteen states against insurance companies, following decision by DOJ not to accept states'
invitation to investigate the industry). See also Carole R. Doris, Another View on State Antitrust
Enforcement-A Reply to Judge Posner, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 345 (2001).
238. Seethe National Association of Attorneys Generalathttp://www.naag.org./naag/about-naag.php
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (describing as one of its goals the promotion of cooperation and coordination
on interstate legal matters to foster a more responsive and efficient legal system for state citizens).
239. Wolfiam & Waller, supra note 226, at 4. See also http://www.naag.org./naag/about-naag.php
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (home page of National Association of Attorneys General discussing
representation of the public interest by popularly elected attorneys general).
240. For example, the state attorneys general were actively involved in negotiating their settlement
with the defendants in the international vitamins case. See Wolfiam & Waller, supra note 226, at 38-39.
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jeopardize the interests and rights of the United States at the international
level. While the Constitution is sensitive to such concerns, it only provides
a partial answer as to why the states cannot (as opposed to should not) enter
this controversial arena.
Several branches of federal foreign affairs constitutional jurisprudence
arguably stand in the way of a successful state antitrust suit against OPEC.
First, the text of the Constitution strictly limits the role ofthe states in the area
of foreign affairs.241 A line of cases stretching back to the 1930s strongly
suggest that the foreign affair powers is strictly federal. While drawing the
line between presidential and congressional prerogatives is often difficult,24 2
the cases are clear that the states may not act in matters such as foreign affairs
which are exclusively the province of the federal government. For instance,
in Zschernig v. Miller,243 the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon probate
law which prohibited Soviet block citizens from inheriting personal property.
The Court discussed the intrusion of the State into the field of foreign affairs
"which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress"244 and the
need to prohibit interference with the conduct of foreign affairs by the federal
government,245
The vitality of Zschernig itself is, however, a matter for lively debate.
Zschernig itself ignored Clarkv. Allen,246 an earlier case upholding a similar
statute. Later cases have either approved certain nondiscriminatory state
actions affecting foreign nations and multinational enterprise247 or invalidated
state statutes on narrower grounds without citing Zschernig and its foreign
policy rationale.248 This has led some scholars to conclude that Zschernighas

241. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (states may not enter into compacts with foreign nations without
congressional approval); U.S. CONST. art. IL § 2 (vesting Presidmt with powers as commander in chief to
enter into treaties with the advice and consent of Senate and to nominate and receive Ambassadors). See
also U.S. ART. OF CONFED. art. IX(repealed 1788), available athttp://www.usconstitution.net/articles.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
242. Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (President is the
sole organ of nation in the conduct of foreign affairs) with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (setting out sliding scale of when Presidential action in foreign affairs is permissible
depending on prior actions and acquiescence of Congress). Cf. Dames& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654

(1981) (importance of congressional acquiescence in Presidential settlement of foreign claims).
243. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
244. Id. at 432.
245. Id. at 441.
246. 331 U.S. 503 (1947)
247. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
248. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
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been either effectively overruled or is no longer needed in a post cold war
world.249
Regardless of the strength of Zschernig and its progeny, there are still a
number of strong constitutional reasons to prevent the states, or a private actor
under state law, from taking action which would jeopardize the foreign policy
objectives of the United States. The Supreme Court has been far stricter in
holding that state statutes are preempted by federal law when the state statute
touches closely on foreign relations. In Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council,25 ° the Supreme Court unanimously struck down Massachusetts laws
that imposed sanctions on firms and individuals doing business with the
repressive government in Myanmar because of a conflict with the more
comprehensive federal sanctions vesting broader, but more discretionary
powers, with the President.
" ' the Supreme Court unanimously
Similarly, in United States v. Locke,25
overturned a Washington state statute and regulations governing oil tanker
liability because of its conflict with federal law in the area. In Locke, the
Court found the regulation of interstate and international transportation to be
a matter of inherently federal concern."'
Against a background of
comprehensive federal regulation and a web of treaties, the Court found the
need for a single voice and consistency to be paramount and held that the state
regulatory scheme was preempted even where the state rules were similar to
the federal requirements." 3
A much more nuanced analysis would be needed, however, before a state
law antitrustaction would be overturned on these grounds. The existence of
state antitrust laws are not preempted by the existence of the federal antitrust
laws. In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically held that state antitrust laws
are not preempted even if they differ significantly from their federal

249. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The AbidingRelevance ofFederalism to US. Foreign
Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 678 n.23 (1998); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U.
COLo. L. REv. 1223,1266 (1999); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63
OHIo ST. L.J. 649 (2002). But see Edward T. Swaine, Crosby as Foreign Relations Law, 41 V. J. INT'L L.
481 (2001) (affirming the importance of general foreign powers despite lack of explicit discussion in the
Supreme Court opinion in Crosby); Howard N. Fenton I, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs:
State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions,13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 563 (1993).
250. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
251. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
252. Id. at 99. See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221 (2d Dist.
1969) (holding that the California Buy American Act is an unconstitutional invasion of the foreign affairs
power of the federal government).
253. Locke, 529 U.S. at 115.
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counterparts.254 There have been a number of foreign commerce antitrust
cases initiated by the states both where the federal government has already
acted,2" and, on occasion, where the federal government has refused to act.256
Moreover, the sovereign decision of the state to invoke its law enforcement
power to bring an antitrust action against a foreign defendant is a very
different matter than the usual analysis of a discriminatory state statute that is
either preempted or which violates either the dormant commerce clause 257 or
the dormant treaty power.258
Challenging the constitutionality of a state law antitrust case against
OPEC or its members directly raises the type of challenge to the foreign
policy-making powers of the state that the courts typically duck. 259 However,
there is one consistent theme that emerges from the handful of foreign
commerce/foreign policy decisions, namely, that the foreign policy of the
United States is set in Washington, D.C. and not by the states. States may not
legislate even within their traditional areas of competence when they make
discretionary (or discriminatory) choices between and among our allies and
enemies that create unpleasant consequences for our national foreign policy.
That is the essence of Zschernig and its progeny.26 ° It is the picking and
choosing that is the crux of the problem, not the application of facially neutral
statutes which affect foreign commerce where the Court has been more
lenient.26'
As in the sovereign immunity area, characterization is everything.262 If
this issue ever came before the Supreme Court, the Court would have to
choose between respect for the federal exclusivity (or preeminence, if you

254. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
255. See Wolfram & Wailer, supra note 226.
256. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). But see In re Copper
Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875 (W.D. Wisc. 2000) (mentioning but not resolving defendant's
argument that application of state antitrust law to foreign commerce violated the commerce clause).
257. See, e.g., Tupman Thurlow Co. v. Moss, 252 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
258. For a discussion ofthe concept of the dormant treaty clause, see Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating
Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127 (2000).
259. But see Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (overturning state
law on both preemption a nd foreign affairs grounds), aff'd on preemption grounds subnom. Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
260. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E2d 300 (111. 1986); Bethlehem Steel Corp.
v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 229 (2d Dist. 1969).
261. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994). But see Japan Line Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (striking down a facially neutral ad valorum property tax

because of potential interference with foreign commerce).
262. See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text (analyzing whether OPEC member state conduct
is a commercial activity or a sovereign regulation of natural resources).
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prefer the revisionist view) in foreign affairs and the inherent sovereignty of
the states. This is an extremely delicate matter where Congress has not been
able to enact legislation one way
or the other and the executive branch has
2 63
deliberately chosen not to act.
XI. How

TO CONDUCT FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

While no attractive private plaintiff or state actor is likely to emerge to
challenge OPEC under the antitrust laws, the federal government remains free
to challenge OPEC or its member nations under the antitrust laws or any other
federal statutory grounds that may exist. There is little reason to think this is
actually going to happen. OPEC has been in existence since 1960 and the
federal government has pointedly refused to bring suit or to participate in any
way in the private suits that have been brought. Broad questions of foreign
policy, national security, dependence on foreign oil, the fight against
terrorism, efforts to combat money laundering, and the continuing quagmire
of Middle East politics presumably play a role in deciding that antitrust
litigation would be inappropriate,
despite the domestic political gains of
2 64
bringing such a suit.
It was Kingman Brewster who most directly raised the issue of the
interface between the use ofUnited States antitrust laws to attack international
restraints and general foreign economic policy in Antitrust and American
Business Abroad.265 Writing at the height of the cold war, Brewster used
language that still resonates today:
The ideological, military, political, and economic challenge the United States now faces
requires a reappraisal of inherited concepts, policies, and laws. What we do makes more
difference to the rest of the world than it ever did before. And not least important, what
the rest of the world thinks of what we do is more important than ever before. The
conduct of our foreign business and our policies with respect to it are not an insignificant
part of this picture.266

263. As the Canadian rock band Rush so trenchantlyobserved: "If you choose not to decide, you still
have made a choice." Rush, Freewill, on PERMANENT WAVES (Mercury Records 1980).
264. See, e.g., Neela Banajee, The High, Hidden Cost ofSaudi Arabian Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2001, § 4 (Magazine), at 3 (analyzing the complicated diplomatic relationship between the United States
and Saudi Arabia, the leading oil supplier to the U.S.).
265. BREWSTER, supra note 19.

266. Id. at 3.
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Using the international oil industry as an example, Brewster then traced
the ways that antitrust concerns rose and fell in response to foreign policy
concerns and international events in the 1950s.
Perhaps the most dramatic zigzags of official policy toward the conduct of American
foreign business are evidenced by the international oil policy of this decade. Although
oil is in no sense typical of American business abroad, it is a symbol of the convulsions
of the competitive policy beyond the water's edge. Korean War needs and disruption of
world supplies by the Iranian expropriation led the government to authorize a pooling of
foreign production information by the overseas American producers. Not long thereafter
the Federal Trade Commission staff completed a report on the alleged international
petroleum cartel. Shortly before its release, the government commenced a grand jury
investigation of international oil companies. The foreign parties were soon dropped and
a civil complaint was lodged against the five American majors. With this action pending,
the Attorney General gave an opinion that participation of the five majors along with
foreign companies in a consortium to reactivate Iranian production was not in violation
of the antitrust laws. The government also found it necessary to promise antitrust
immunity to the oil industry so that all resources could be pooled and jointly planned in
order to mobilize an oil lift to meet the emergency needs of Western Europe when Suez
was clogged. Outside the antitrust field, contrasting American interests were evidenced
by the executive's unsuccessful claim for alleged overcharges for Middle East oil shipped
to Europe under the Marshall Plan, while the Congress demonstrated its limited
enthusiasm for free import oil competition by tacking a rider on the Reciprocal Trade
Extension Act designed to keep oil imports down to their historic level, by voluntary
action if possible, by Presidential fiat if necessary.267

Brewster's basic argument that the United States should seek to align its
antitrust policy with the broader national interest is as valid today as it was in
1958.26 The goal is to promote the overall national interests and not merely
to press antitrust policy to its arguable outermost legal limits. For Brewster,
this meant reevaluating jurisdictional and other doctrines which created
unnecessary conflicts with allies during the Cold War.26 9 While this may
include restricting private treble damages law suits with strong foreign policy
implications, at a minimum, it also means the national government (not just
the antitrust agencies) fully considering the foreign policy implications of its

267. Id. at 4. Outside the oil field, foreign policy considerations have occasionally trumped
competition concerns as well. Prominent examples include the Reagan Administration's decision not to
proceed with recommended indictments against the foreign and domestic finns which allegedly forced the
bankruptcy of Lake Airways. See WALLER, ANTRITRUST, supra note 43, §4.11. In the international trade
field, antitrust concerns have been frequently subordinated to trade and foreign and domestic political
concerns in the instigation and negotiation of so-called "voluntary restraint agreements" limiting imports
into the United States. See WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 5,§ 14.
268. BREWSTER, supranote 19, at vii. See generallySpencer Weber Waller,Antitrust andAmerican
Business Abroad Today, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 1251 (1995).
269. BREWSTER, supra note 19, at 442-58.
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competition policy and declining to act unless there is a net gain for the
United States. While the jurisdictional and other doctrinal barriers have
fallen, the prosecutorial discretion of both the Justice Department and the FTC
have so far been wisely exercised in refraining from jeopardizing the national
interest by bringing a case that has little prospect of achieving a more
competitive international oil market.
XII. CONCLUSION
There are few if any doctrinal obstacles for the right plaintiff to bring the
right kind of case against OPEC or its member nations. A private plaintiff
who was also a direct purchaser or who could make out the improbable claim
that the OPEC member nations have conspired with the multinational oil
companies would have a case that passes muster under any fair reading of the
requirements of both United States antitrust law and the special defenses that
apply to the anticompetitive actions of foreign governments. State attorneys
general would have a harder time under their own state antitrust laws or their
parens patrie powers in federal courts because of the likely interference with
the exclusively federal foreign affairs power. That leaves the United States
federal antitrust agencies, who could proceed with a case, but who have
chosen not to do so in the past thirty years, despite the obvious domestic
political incentive to attack an unpopular (to say the least) foreign entity and
its member nations.
Does that mean an intrepid antitrust plaintiff will succeed in bringing
OPEC to its knees, where others in the past have failed? Of course not.
Despite the Supreme Court having unintentionally cleared away the dubious
doctrinal underbrush that arguably justified the original OPEC decisions, it is
highly unlikely that any court will let such a case past the pleadings stage.
There is a palpable sense that this is precisely the type of case that courts
should not be deciding on the merits. Doctrine is not so inflexible that
existing defenses and immunities cannot be revived, twisted, applied by
analogy, or simply tortured into dismissing or abstaining from deciding the
suit.
This look inside Pandora's Box suggests a couple of equally troubling
conclusions. In order to reach an eminently sensible conclusion, the courts,
in the original OPEC case and the Cuban expropriation cases before them,
distorted accepted doctrine that still echoes in the many less controversial
international cases that followed. If Prewitt continues to be litigated, or
additional actions are brought, the same thing would undoubtedly happen
again.
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Congress and the Supreme Court have crafted and interpreted doctrine to
address the easy cases, and not the hard ones from which the defenses and
immunities were designed to protect us. Note that I have said us, not them or
the defendants. In the end, the FSIA, the Act of State Doctrine, and related
notions should be interpreted to protect the courts from having to decide cases
that they are ill-equipped to handle and that would be disastrous for the
country if adjudicated on the merits. Our most fundamental foreign policies
should be made at the federal level through diplomacy and the appropriate
interaction between the executive and legislative branches and not via
lawsuits.
So, why can't you sue OPEC? To paraphrase President Nixon, our chief
executive0 at the time of the first energy crisis, you can do it but it would be
wrong.

27

270. THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSCRIPTS 117-18 (Delacorte Press 1974) (Meeting: The President, John
Dean and John Haldeman, Oval Office, Mar. 21, 1973, 10:12-11:55 a.m.).
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